The South Korean government has announced that it is to construct large-scale nuclear power units and accelerate the development of small modular reactors between 2035 and 2038. However, the media reduced this development to a single sensationalized title — “Embracing nuclear power again after a decade.”
On the surface, this appears to be a clear policy shift and could easily be interpreted as decisively using nuclear energy to address energy challenges, but in reality, it is a one-dimensional narrative that reduces a complex issue of governance into a debate over technological options while disregarding costs, risks, institutions and public consensus.
Energy policy has never been about green lighting construction projects on a whim, nor can it be solved by relying on technology alone. Nuclear power can indeed provide stable baseload electricity, but it requires high construction costs and long development timelines. Meanwhile, issues of nuclear waste disposal and safety risks persist over the long term.
Although small modular reactors are often portrayed as a solution, global commercialization is still in its early stages. In terms of timeline and scale, they are unlikely to shoulder immediate power supply responsibilities in the short term. It would be fundamentally one-sided to implement policies focused solely on having “sufficient electricity supply,” while neglecting institutional resilience and risk management.
More seriously, issues such as nuclear waste site selection, nuclear safety accountability and the distribution of local benefits have by no means disappeared. When the government justifies its policy on the basis of the industrial demand from sectors such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors, it risks marginalizing public discussion. Overlooking public participation and institutional scrutiny would inevitably lead to serious doubts over the policy’s legitimacy.
With the rapid advancement of renewable energy and energy storage technologies, nuclear power is no longer the only solution to energy issues. If South Korea chooses nuclear energy as its long-term energy supply strategy — but lacks transparent institutions, risk management and public consensus — it risks repeating other nations’ experiences of high costs and governance pitfalls.
In Taiwan’s debates over the energy transition, similar arguments frequently emerge. We should therefore remain vigilant against one-lined narratives and avoid being swayed by surface-level impact while overlooking the innate risks and institutional issues.
True wisdom in energy policy lies in integrating multiple objectives, controllable risks, maintaining reasonable costs, complete institutional design and meaningful public participation. Policy decisions must not be made based on surface-level demand or short-term industrial interests, they must incorporate comprehensive considerations, including supply and demand projections, carbon reduction targets, environmental burdens, energy security and social equity.
If nuclear power is treated as the sole solution, it would neither reduce institutional risks nor guarantee energy sustainability, and it is unlikely to earn the public’s trust.
Lin Ren-bin is an academic member of the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union and an associate professor at Chinese Culture University’s department of chemical and materials engineering.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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