As tensions across the Taiwan Strait continue to escalate, public attention to “whole-of-society defense resilience” has reached unprecedented levels in Taiwan. In response, the government in November released the guidebook In Case of Crisis: Taiwan’s National Public Safety Guide (the “Orange Book”) and distributed it to every household. The handbook aims to provide clear guidance on evacuation plans, self-help and mutual aid during major emergencies — implicitly including wartime scenarios.
The handbook’s design resembles that of an IKEA assembly instruction book: a step-by-step, highly simplified format that assumes even a novice can follow the instructions to “assemble” their own safety package. However, the critical question is whether this design logic translates into a sense of capability among citizens. After reading the handbook, do Taiwanese truly believe they can secure their safety and effectively respond to emergencies?
To evaluate this question, the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in November commissioned the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University to conduct an online survey. The study employed a randomized experimental design in which respondents were assigned to one of two groups. The experimental group was presented with a summary of the handbook, while the control group read an unrelated article about public art installations.
After exposure to the assigned material, respondents’ levels of self-efficacy — their perceived ability to cope with and respond to emergency situations — were measured. To ensure the robustness of the findings, the survey employed a statistical model that estimated the impact of being exposed to a summary of the handbook while controlling for key demographic variables, including gender, age, education and party identification.
When asked “if a military conflict or related disaster occurs, I believe preparation can reduce the risks my family faces,” the experimental group’s level of agreement was significantly higher than that of the control group. Model predictions indicate that exposure to the handbook significantly increases agreement with the belief that “preparation is useful.”
However, when the questions turned to specific operational confidence, the effects vanished. The differences in the control and experimental groups’ answers to “I am confident that I can protect my own basic safety” and “Even if communications break down, my family and I could reunite smoothly” were substantively negligible and statistically insignificant.
This implies that while the handbook succeeds in informing the public that they should prepare, it fails to make them feel they have the capability to cope with potential emergencies.
Why does the public perceive the Orange Book as “useful” yet still lack confidence in their ability to carry out its guidance? First, the text read by the experimental group contained highly specific content, such as preparing 3 liters of drinking water per day, the specific contents of an emergency “Go Bag” and what to do upon hearing an air raid siren. These specific details enhanced “actionability,” leading to the perception that risks can be mitigated through preparation.
However, reading alone primarily changes cognition; it does not generate a feeling of operational capability. This limitation becomes especially evident when respondents are asked to imagine extreme, high-stress scenarios — such as locating family members after communications have been cut off — situations that are far removed from the lived experience of a digitally connected society. In such contexts, abstract knowledge is insufficient to produce confidence.
Bridging this gap between cognition and sense of capability must be the government’s next priority. As a popular Internet saying goes: “My eyes have learned it, but my hands have not.”
The most effective way to boost public efficacy is to promote physical drills across communities, schools and corporations. Citizens need to physically walk to shelters and practice alternative communication protocols during a network blackout, specifically focusing on how to contact family members. It is through actual action that the belief that “I can do this” is strengthened.
In practice, the government should also leverage citizens’ digital habits by embedding disaster preparedness into everyday tools. For example, authorities could encourage the public to download Google’s offline maps, instead of relying on infrequently used disaster-specific apps. Likewise, standardized digital forms that can be saved on smartphones — containing emergency contacts, evacuation locations and other critical information — would help reduce dependence on paper documents.
Most importantly, public defense awareness must be reinforced on a continuous basis. Citizens need to understand that these preparations are not abstract, but directly tied to their own safety and that of their families. By institutionalizing these practices through legislation and integrating the Orange Book’s content into routine training in schools and workplaces, disaster preparedness can move beyond a slogan and become a normal, habitual part of daily life — much like following a set of instructions to assemble a piece of furniture.
Caroline Ying-hsuan Chen is a policy analyst at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research. Her research focuses on the Chinese government’s mechanisms of social and ideological control, influence operations and policy communication, as well as cross-strait relations.
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