In the past few years, a number of undersea cables and key energy pipelines across Europe and the northern Atlantic region have been sabotaged, putting governments on high alert. Cable sabotage has occurred in Asia and Pacific Island nations, resulting in the development of emergency backup and response mechanisms.
Such matters have repeatedly reminded us that in this digital era, it is not only data centers that support global operations; a network of cables stretching thousands of kilometers deep under the sea is crucial. The survival of many nations depends on the power lines.
Whoever controls the flow of information can influence how the world operates. And whoever controls energy and power can decide the fate of nations. Undersea cables are an extremely crucial, yet often overlooked, part of the infrastructure making up today’s world.
UNDERSEA CABLE SECURITY IS A NATIONAL SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICAL CONCERN
A shift has occurred in the perception of undersea cables — especially for Taiwan, which relies heavily on undersea communications and power lines to support its digital economy and citizens’ livelihoods. The security of undersea cables is not only a technological and industrial issue; undersea cables are a strategic asset of great importance to national security, resilience and geopolitics.
Several cases of damage to undersea cables have occurred in the waters surrounding Taiwan, particularly the Taiwan Strait, with such frequency that they have attracted significant attention and shown that ongoing risks to such cables continue to rise.
Repeated damage occurred early last year. International cables in the waters off Keelung were damaged by the Shunxing 39, a Cameroon-flagged freighter with Chinese ties. Meanwhile, the Taiwan-Penghu No. 3 undersea cable was cut by the Hong Tai 58, a Togo-flagged cargo ship operated with Chinese backing.
As a means of engaging in gray-zone harassment and hybrid threats, damaging undersea cables is low-cost, but has a high-impact on the functioning of society and affects a nation’s domestic and overseas linkages.
UN RESOLUTION
Even more alarmingly, in the political and legal domains, China is misrepresenting UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 in an attempt to forcibly link this issue with that of its so-called “one China principle.” It is suppressing Taiwan’s international participation and leaning hard on other nations with the intention of isolating Taiwan while creating a legal basis for a future invasion of Taiwan.
At the same time, through a range of methods taking place in the skies, and above and below the sea, China is unilaterally changing the “status quo” across the Taiwan Strait.
In the air, China has unilaterally imposed new flight routes and carried out military exercises in a bid to strangle Taiwan’s air links with the outside world. At sea, China aims to block freedom of navigation operations conducted by foreign warships and make the Taiwan Strait its own internal waters, which would impact global seaborne commerce. And under the sea, through its efforts to cut off Taiwan proper from the nation’s outlying islands, and even to sever Taiwan’s international undersea cable connections, China is attempting to impede the flow of information and capital.
These actions not only threaten Taiwan’s security, but pose huge risks to regional stability and worldwide digital networks. Taiwan serves as a key link in global supply chains. Severing any of Taiwan’s links to the outside world would not just leave Taiwan isolated; it could break connections between various locations across the world, generating massive global upheaval. Indeed, damage to undersea cables and the effect on capital and information flows could generate a damaging shock, impacting the highly digitalized, information-oriented global economic system.
RESPONDING TO RISKS WITH INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS: TRANSFORMING TAIWAN’S EXPERIENCE INTO INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS
In facing China’s increasing use of gray-zone tactics, which aim to disrupt the international order and threaten the security of critical infrastructure, Taiwan has chosen to respond to the risks head-on through institutional frameworks and cooperation.
The Legislative Yuan has passed the third reading of amendments to seven laws put forward by the Executive Yuan designed to comprehensively strengthen the protection, management and related enforcement mechanisms of undersea cables and pipelines.
These legal measures could serve to deter malicious damage to and regulatory violations of undersea cables, addressing long-standing security challenges while underscoring the government’s commitment to undersea cable security as a core pillar of national resilience.
In parallel, Taiwan is exploring ways to translate its own experience into policy solutions that can be shared with the global community. In October last year, at the Taiwan-Europe Undersea Cable Security Forum cohosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European chapter of the Formosa Club, I proposed the RISK Management Initiative on International Undersea Cables.
The initiative received support from 42 parliamentarians representing 18 European countries and was incorporated into the joint statement adopted at the Formosa Club’s annual summit in Taipei. This move symbolized Taiwan’s evolution from a party affected by related issues into a proactive actor proposing institutional initiatives.
THE RISK INITIATIVE: BUILDING A MORE RESILIENT INTERNATIONAL UNDERSEA CABLE SECURITY NETWORK
The RISK Initiative focuses on addressing risk through the provision of four mutually supportive policy goals:
First, risk mitigation, which seeks to enhance emergency repair and backup capabilities through transnational coordination;
Second, information sharing, which involves establishing threat intelligence exchanges and early warning mechanisms;
Third, systemic reform, which aims to review deficiencies in international and domestic regulations when addressing hybrid threats;
Fourth, knowledge building, which focuses on comprehensively improving protection and resilience through professional training and practical exchanges at an international level.
These four pillars, which are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, have the objective of creating a more resilient and sustainable international undersea cable security network.
To translate vision into action, Taiwan has designed a multilayered, cooperative pathway that promotes institutional frameworks and substantive cooperation. We look forward to working with like-minded partners to build a resilient undersea cable security network and ensure that undersea cables become a commonly protected global public good rather than a point of vulnerability for democratic societies.
At a parliamentary level, we are communicating closely with such countries as the US, Japan and Australia, as well as European nations, through our overseas missions, securing political support and promoting the inclusion of undersea cable security in pro-Taiwan resolutions. This would allow the issue to become part of a policy agenda common to democratic partners.
At the administrative and law enforcement levels, we seek to work with international coast guard and undersea cable authorities to conduct exchanges and establish long-term cooperation mechanisms.
This includes the exchange of information on substandard vessels and the sharing of intelligence regarding vulnerable cables, which would enhance early warning and response capabilities. It involves promoting the development and application of technologies that can facilitate the maintenance of undersea cable security and utilizing technology to assist in law enforcement.
In terms of policy and institutional development, Taiwan is placing the RISK Initiative at the center of its efforts, collaborating with domestic and international think tanks and experts to deepen consensus through seminars and professional exchanges.
By leveraging the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, Taiwan can call on experts from a range of nations to jointly examine tangible measures for preventing and mitigating risks to undersea cables.
We are facilitating overseas exchanges for our experts and academics so that they can share their experiences in maintenance, repair and law enforcement with like-minded partners, laying a solid foundation of expertise and trust needed for long-term cooperation.
SAFEGUARDING UNDERSEA CABLES ENSURES THE CONNECTIVITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY
In the past few years, democracies — including countries in the EU, the UK, the US, Japan and Australia — have all identified undersea cables as critical infrastructure that is vital to national security and the global digital order. They have sought to strengthen related protections through legislation, action plans and transnational cooperation.
Undersea cables are more than merely infrastructure; they are a public good within the global digital economy and serve as lifelines in connecting democratic societies. Taiwan is willing and able to serve as a pivotal node within the global undersea cable security network, and work hand in hand with like-minded partners to jointly safeguard these critical arteries that sustain operations throughout the world.
Lin Chia-lung is the minister of foreign affairs.
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