In an international system increasingly shaped by coercion, power politics and transactional diplomacy, multilateralism is often dismissed as naive or obsolete — especially for smaller countries living next to much larger neighbors. Taiwan’s experience suggests the opposite. For Taipei, multilateralism has not been an act of idealism, but a carefully cultivated source of strategic strength.
Denied formal diplomatic recognition by much of the world and excluded from the UN system, Taiwan has nevertheless embedded itself deeply into the functioning of the global economy. It has done so not through confrontation or rhetoric, but through rules, institutions and credibility. That quiet, patient strategy offers lessons not only for Taiwan’s supporters, but for smaller and middle powers everywhere.
Taiwan’s engagement with multilateral institutions — most notably the WTO — demonstrates how influence could be exercised even in the absence of recognition. The WTO is one of the few international organizations where Taiwan participates as a full member, albeit under the name “Chinese Taipei.” Yet within negotiating rooms and committee meetings, labels matter far less than preparation, competence and institutional fluency.
I observed this first-hand during my years in Geneva. Taiwanese delegates were consistently among the most technically rigorous participants in the room. They intervened selectively, grounded their positions in legal text and data, and avoided political theater. Over time, their approach earned respect and trust, even from countries with no diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In a rules-based system, credibility itself becomes a form of power — and Taiwan has invested in it carefully.
Such institutional engagement has had repercussions far beyond trade diplomacy. By anchoring itself firmly within global trade rules, supply chains and standards-setting processes, Taipei has made its stability internationally relevant. Any serious disruption in Taiwan would no longer be a purely bilateral issue; it would reverberate across industries, markets and economies worldwide. Multilateralism, in this sense, has acted as a force multiplier for Taiwan’s security.
Economic strategy reinforces that logic. Taiwan trades extensively with China, yet it has avoided becoming strategically dependent. Critical sectors — particularly advanced semiconductor manufacturing and design — are protected through a combination of domestic policy and alignment with global trade and technology regimes. Rather than rejecting interdependence,
Taiwan has structured it carefully, ensuring that economic integration does not translate into political vulnerability.
Therefore, deterrence is not only a military matter. It is institutional and economic. Coercion becomes more difficult when it risks contravening rules, disrupting supply chains and alienating multiple stakeholders simultaneously. For smaller states, it is a crucial insight: Multilateral integration, pursued intelligently, could raise the costs of coercion in ways that military spending alone cannot.
Taiwan’s multilateral posture also shapes its diplomacy. Taipei has avoided absolutist positions or dramatic declarations that would narrow its room for maneuver. Strategic ambiguity — often misunderstood as weakness — has complemented its institutional strategy. By acting as a predictable, rules-abiding participant in international systems, Taiwan denies adversaries easy pretexts for escalation while reinforcing its image as a responsible stakeholder.
That external restraint rests on strong internal foundations. Taiwan’s democratic legitimacy, institutional competence and social cohesion enhance its credibility in multilateral settings. Rules-based systems reward reliability, transparency and governance quality — areas in which Taiwan performs well. Internal resilience is inseparable from external strategy.
However, any honest assessment must acknowledge a central caveat. Taiwan’s ability to leverage multilateralism operates under the shadow of the US. Washington’s security guarantees, extended deterrence and strategic ambiguity create the space within which Taiwan’s institutional strategy can function. A significant shift in US priorities would inevitably narrow that space.
Yet this does not diminish the value of Taiwan’s approach. External partnerships matter, but they are most effective when combined with domestic capacity and diversified international engagement. Multilateralism cannot replace hard power, but it could amplify it — and, in Taiwan’s case, compensate intelligently for its absence.
The quiet strength of Taiwan’s multilateralism lies precisely in its restraint. It does not seek confrontation, nor does it rely on recognition. Instead, it builds relevance, credibility and resilience over time. In an era when power politics is resurgent and rules are under strain, Taiwan offers a timely reminder: For smaller countries, survival is not about being loud — it is about being indispensable.
Shishir Priyadarshi is president of the Chintan Research Foundation and a former director of the WTO.
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