This year, Taiwan-Indonesia relations continued their steady upward trajectory, driven by expanding economic cooperation, cultural and educational exchanges, and growing people-to-people ties — despite the enduring constraints imposed by Jakarta’s adherence to its “one China” policy. Against a backdrop of heightened cross-strait tensions and shifting geopolitical currents, both sides pursued pragmatic collaboration.
The relationship this year was defined by incremental deepening across three key areas: economic and commercial expansion, societal and soft-power engagement, and the regional geopolitical context.
Building on trade links, both sides renewed and expanded mechanisms to diversify cooperation. Late last month, Taipei and Jakarta signed two significant memorandums of understanding aimed at strengthening trade promotion and halal industry cooperation. The memorandums expanded collaboration into fisheries, processed food, household goods, medical devices, and creative and digital sectors. They also established frameworks for trade fairs, business seminars and industry dialogues.
Trade data from the first quarter showed a slight dip in overall bilateral trade, with modest contractions in Indonesian exports and Taiwanese imports. Nonetheless, cooperation remained resilient. Taiwan reaffirmed its role as a key partner for Indonesia, particularly in sustainable energy, healthcare and infrastructure investment.
Technology and innovation further symbolized deepening economic ties. At the Indonesia Technology and Innovation Expo, Taiwan made its debut with a pavilion showcasing 15 technology firms. The exhibition underscored Taiwan’s technological strengths, and Indonesia’s growing demand for digital solutions.
Agricultural cooperation also saw renewed momentum. Taipei announced plans to launch new agricultural programs in South Sulawesi and West Java focused on seed production and vegetable supply chain development.
Beyond economics, people-to-people engagement emerged as a central pillar of the relationship. Tourism diplomacy played a visible role, with the Taiwan Travel Fair in Jakarta targeting young Indonesians through lifestyle-oriented promotions and travel incentives.
In September, Taipei Economic and Trade Office in Indonesia officials visited Jakarta’s Antara Heritage Center to advance language, arts and heritage collaboration, reinforcing mutual understanding at the societal level.
Even as cooperation expanded, geopolitical constraints continued to shape the relationship. Indonesia reaffirmed its commitment to its “one China” policy, reiterating that it does not recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereign state. This position remained central to Jakarta’s diplomacy and limited political engagement. A viral leaked conversation involving Indonesian leadership highlighted sensitivities surrounding Taiwan-related issues, prompting a public response from Taipei.
Rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and evolving US policy toward Taiwan added further complexity. US legislative and defense support shaped the strategic environment, which Indonesia monitored closely.
Taiwan-Indonesia relations this year demonstrated how pragmatism, economic interests and societal engagement can sustain meaningful cooperation without formal diplomatic recognition. While Jakarta’s “one China” policy remains unchanged, the expanding scope of unofficial ties signals a resilient and multifaceted relationship. As Indonesia navigates intensifying Asia-Pacific dynamics, its engagement with Taiwan is likely to remain a carefully calibrated blend of opportunity and caution.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is director of the China-Indonesia Desk at the Center of Economic and Law Studies in Jakarta.
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