Taiwan-India relations appear to have been put on the back burner this year, including on Taiwan’s side. Geopolitical pressures have compelled both countries to recalibrate their priorities, even as their core security challenges remain unchanged.
However, what is striking is the visible decline in the attention India once received from Taiwan. The absence of the annual Diwali celebrations for the Indian community and the lack of a commemoration marking the 30-year anniversary of the representative offices, the India Taipei Association and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center, speak volumes and raise serious questions about whether Taiwan still has a coherent India policy, and if so, what it entails.
Taiwan undoubtedly faces mounting pressures, not least due to the unpredictability of US President Donald Trump’s administration, given that the US remains Taiwan’s primary security partner. Yet Taipei cannot afford to put all its eggs in one basket, which is effectively what it appears to be doing.
The impression is that only the Western world commands Taiwan’s attention, which might reflect the hope that such symbolic support would continue amid China’s rising aggression.
However, are statements enough?
More importantly, what happens to long-term, sustainable partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region? Taiwan cannot afford to neglect regional countries simply because they might be cautious in issuing public statements.
For Taiwan, diversifying partnerships and sustaining regional engagement is a strategic necessity. Even if the US were to return to a more consistent approach toward allies and regional networks, Taiwan would be unable to simply resume relations with regional countries from where they left off. Lost momentum must be rebuilt, and that requires sustained effort and political will.
India, in this context, remains a key regional player and an integral component of the Indo-Pacific security architecture. Yet the focus on India has clearly waned this year. Taiwan’s growing preoccupation with the Western world, Washington’s erratic policy signals and Taipei’s perception of limited reciprocity from New Delhi have collectively contributed to the shift.
The result is a clear mismatch of expectations, with Taiwan seemingly no longer viewing India as a decisive actor in a contingency scenario.
That assumption is deeply flawed. Most Indo-Pacific countries would not rally around Taiwan solely on the basis of shared democratic values. Their responses in a crisis would depend on the depth of their relationship and the concrete interests at stake.
Without a strong bilateral foundation, many countries, including India, are more likely to default to neutrality. That is precisely why Taiwan must rebuild focus and engagement with India.
To do so, Taiwan should first firmly recommit to the New Southbound Policy Plus and articulate a dedicated India policy. It was a landmark initiative in Taiwan’s foreign policy history, offering a comprehensive framework for regional outreach. Treating it as a serious long-term strategy would bolster Taiwan’s regional positioning and restore momentum in its engagement with India.
Second, Taiwan must address the wide knowledge gap on India. Much of the prevailing narrative remains outdated and filtered through a Western lens. Establishing India studies centers across Taiwanese universities would be a vital step forward. Taiwan needs to develop its own expertise and understanding of countries and regions, regardless of how appealing the US and Europe might be.
The gap must be bridged within the diplomatic corps, strategic community and media alike. The era when secondhand knowledge of India sufficed is long over. Taiwan must learn to see India, and other regional partners, through its own lens rather than borrowed Western perspectives shaped by external priorities.
Third, Taiwan should further institutionalize ties with India by encouraging Indian participation in the Global Cooperation Training Framework, and by supporting think tanks and institutions dedicated to promoting and enhancing bilateral relations.
Fourth, India has shown willingness to cooperate with Taiwan in the semiconductor sector. Supporting India’s semiconductor ambitions would help lay a durable and resilient foundation for long-term partnership.
Fifth, legislative engagement deserves far greater attention. The now-defunct parliamentary association with India must be revived. It is dispiriting to see Taiwanese legislators move swiftly to establish parliamentary associations with European countries, while outreach to Indian lawmakers remains virtually absent.
Taiwan must recognize that drawing India closer would be a gradual process that depends on sustained relationship-building. The assumption that democracies would automatically stand together no longer holds in today’s geopolitical environment, particularly when even the US has turned inward.
States act primarily based on their own self-interests. For India, cooperation with Taiwan, especially in the economic and technological domains, aligns clearly with those interests. Taiwan should capitalize on this convergence.
The Taiwan-India partnership has the potential to become one of the defining relationships of the Indo-Pacific region in the 21st century, but only if both sides recognize its value and are willing to invest in it.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. The views expressed in this article are her own.
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