There has been much catastrophizing in Taiwan recently about America becoming more unreliable as a bulwark against Chinese pressure. Some of this has been sparked by debates in Washington about whether the United States should defend Taiwan in event of conflict. There also were understandable anxieties about whether President Trump would sacrifice Taiwan’s interests for a trade deal when he sat down with President Xi (習近平) in late October. On top of that, Taiwan’s opposition political leaders have sought to score political points by attacking the Lai (賴清德) administration for mishandling relations with the United States.
Part of this budding anxiety in Taiwan is a function of style. Trump’s diplomatic approach on Taiwan is different. He is not going to memorize and recite America’s longstanding One China policy. Trump likes to apply public pressure on Taiwan to spend more on defense, invest more in the United States, and buy more US exports. He does not pretend to care about shared democratic values. Where other leaders have sought to highlight the threat China poses to Taiwan, Trump is the exact opposite. Instead, he asserts (without evidence) that Xi has promised him China will not take military action against Taiwan so long as he is president.
Trump’s approach is disruptive, transactional, unsentimental, and amoral. Much the same could also be said about Trump’s posture toward America’s allies in Europe and Asia. Trump’s domestic supporters applaud this tougher approach, believing it will prod allies to invest more in their own defense and rely less upon the United States for their security. According to this logic, Trump’s tough love will force allies to grow stronger and more capable, leading to a world in which America and its partners end up in a more advantageous position to protect shared interests.
Critics of Trump’s diplomacy argue that he is undermining America’s foundational sources of strength on the world stage. These include America’s cohesion with allies and its ability to attract the world’s best and brightest minds to conduct research and launch transformative companies in the United States.
In other words, America is in a period of strategic transition. Some foreign policy specialists question the orthodoxy of past US policy towards East Asia, including Taiwan. Others support the fundamentals of past American strategy even as they encourage revisions on the margins. This division has created an opening for new voices in the Taiwan policy debate to gain more prominence. The group of thinkers that has most capitalized on this opening can loosely be referred to as “restrainers.” They advocate for America to be more selective and judicious in exercising power abroad. This group is not a monolith. Some believe the United States should withdraw from an active global leadership role to focus more on America’s own challenges at home. Others argue that the United States needs to be more cautious about when and where it intervenes, but not necessarily become isolationist.
Arguments advocating for greater restraint are not new in the United States. Foreign policy scholars such as Michael Swaine, Chas Freeman, Charles Glaser, Lyle Goldstein, and others have been making variations of these arguments for many years. The difference now, though, is that the Trump administration is instinctively skeptical of longstanding policies, opposed to globalism and multilateralism, wary of becoming entangled in avoidable wars, and eager to embrace new arguments that validate Trump’s instincts.
Trump is drawn to arguments that justify shifting greater burden for addressing international challenges to others. And he is interested in differentiating himself from President Biden’s foreign policy, which was instinctively and sometimes unquestioningly supportive of allies and partners.
Even so, I still believe there are limits to how far Trump will go in upending America’s longstanding approach to Taiwan. First, Trump cares deeply and personally about his legacy for strength and peacemaking. He does not want his legacy to be one of being drawn into a cross-Strait conflict, or of being pushed around by Xi Jinping on Taiwan. Second, Trump is aware of Taiwan’s criticality for his goals around reindustrializing the United States and fostering leadership in artificial intelligence. Given Taiwan’s irreplaceable role in semiconductor chip production and advanced manufacturing, there is no substitute to Taiwan for making progress on Trump’s top economic goals.
During his first administration, Trump delegated much of the day-to-day management of US-Taiwan relations to his advisors. Trump’s first-term team was staunchly pro-Taiwan. After Trump watched his National Security Council officials testify against him at Congressional impeachment hearings toward the end of his first term, though, he soured on the National Security Council staff. Now that he is back in office, Trump retains greater control over sensitive and important policy issues such as Taiwan, rather than delegate them to his staff.
As such, Trump’s views will be determinative of America’s approach to cross-Strait issues for the coming years. Thus far in his second term, Trump has been timid in his approach to Taiwan. His administration has deferred a transit by President Lai, declined a planned visit by Minister of National Defense Koo (顧立雄), and exercised extreme caution on new arms sales packages.
At a strategic level, though, Trump has reiterated his interest in sustaining the cross-Strait status quo. He is not interested in being drawn into debates over Taiwan’s sovereignty or whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if attacked.
Any forecast of Trump’s actions must also acknowledge that he is impulsive and self-assured. Trump continues to believe he can strike big deals with Xi Jinping. He seems to view flattery and concessions as preferred negotiating tools with Xi. Against this backdrop, Taiwan will need to remain nimble in how it presents its value proposition to the United States. Recitations of a struggle between democracy versus autocracy will not move Trump.
Ultimately, I expect debates over Taiwan within America’s foreign policy community will continue to percolate in the coming years. The debate might edge in a direction, but it will not be fully resolved before America’s 2028 elections, that is unless Beijing or Taipei takes unilateral actions that cause America to take countermeasures to uphold its topmost interest in peace and stability. Trump will maintain his unorthodox style, but at the end of the day, I expect his actions in aggregate will tend toward sustaining the cross-Strait status quo.
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution.
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