The Honduran elections seem to have put China on defense. The promises of trade and aid have failed to materialize, industries are frustrated, and leading candidate Salvador Nasralla, who has increased his lead in the polls, has caused Beijing to engage in a surge of activity that appears more like damage control than partnership building.
As Nasralla’s momentum has grown, China’s diplomacy, which seems to be dormant since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2023, has shown several attempts to avoid a reversal if the Liberal or the National party — which also favor Taipei — emerge as winners in the upcoming election.
One of the biggest criticisms that China has faced is its unfulfilled promises to the shrimp sector, which has caused the loss of thousands of jobs in the southern region. However, in late August, Honduran media reported that Honduran Ambassador to China Salvador Moncada participated in the signing of contracts for 3,000 tonnes of shrimp, worth more than US$50 million, to be exported to China. The timing suggested political intent: The deals extend two years into the future, effectively binding their fulfillment to the ruling party’s continuation in power or to any incoming government’s willingness to keep ties with Beijing.
Beijing also promoted new scholarships and infrastructure deals, but the rollout of the program seems to be reactive rather than a well thought-out relationship-building strategy. After two years of silence, the Chinese embassy in Tegucigalpa suddenly announced a scholarship program in April — giving students just 11 days to apply. Facing criticism, it extended the deadline to the end of June, but the memorandum of understanding was not signed until Aug. 14, on the same day the first 27 Honduran students received their certificates to study in China.
These efforts looked less like planned cooperation and more like a hasty attempt to counter political headwinds ahead of the country’s election.
Soon after, the ruling Liberty and Refoundation Party organized a parliamentary delegation to China on Sept. 11. The trip was led by Honduran Congress Vice President Rasel Tome. Liberal Party lawmakers refused to join, reaffirming their pro-US and pro-Taiwan positions, while some National Party members joined, despite an instruction from their leadership not to participate.
On Sept. 13, the Chinese embassy also donated computer equipment to the Honduran Congress, an event that received far greater publicity than similar contributions from other partners, being published on Congress’ social media accounts, something that goes beyond normal donation protocols.
Under ordinary circumstances, these might seem routine gestures. However, with less than a month until election day, the timing underscores Beijing’s anxiety about losing its newest diplomatic partner.
The pattern seems to be consistent: When trying to poach an ally from Taiwan, Beijing floods the area with gifts, promises, gestures and attention. However, once the relationship has been established, the engagement slows, leaving partner countries uncertain about China’s reliability.
Something similar happened with the reported interest from China to build an interoceanic canal, which was never publicly announced. To this day, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega has tried to revive the project as an alternative to the Panama Canal, looking for investment from China and Russia without success. The approach in Honduras might be called crisis diplomacy — a reactive, transactional form of engagement driven more by fear of losing face than by genuine partnership. It allows Beijing to secure headlines quickly, but voters in Honduras do not seem to trust China’s promises so late in the game.
For Taipei, Honduras’ story carries significant meaning. If Nasralla wins and restores ties, Honduras would become the first country since Saint Lucia in 2007 to re-establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Such an outcome would reaffirm Taiwan’s reputation for reliability and people-centered cooperation. Decades of agricultural training, technical assistance and educational programs in Central America have built goodwill even among citizens of countries that no longer recognize Taipei. In contrast, Beijing’s high-profile promises often fail to reach local communities.
Nostalgia for Taiwan’s pragmatic support still runs deep. Its aid programs — from aquaculture to vocational education — were tangible and transparent, while China’s assistance is now seen by many Hondurans as political theater aimed at elites rather than ordinary citizens.
A diplomatic reversal would mark a watershed moment in Taiwan’s foreign policy, a sign that persistence and authenticity can overcome economic disparity, strengthening Taiwan’s hand as it works to preserve allies such as Guatemala, Belize and Paraguay. If it does not, the Honduran experience would still serve as a cautionary tale for other nations weighing Beijing’s offers against their long-term interests.
More broadly, Honduras underscores the limits of China’s global influence. Beijing can attract partners quickly, but sustaining those relationships requires credibility that quick-fix diplomacy might not be able to provide. Repeated overpromising erodes trust and breeds skepticism — especially in regions where governments face pressure to deliver real economic results.
For Taiwan, this presents a clear opportunity. Taipei cannot match Beijing’s spending, but it can outlast it through consistency and transparency. Programs that deliver visible results — agricultural training, medical missions and technology cooperation — speak louder than billion-dollar announcements that could never materialize.
Ultimately, Honduras shows that China’s diplomacy thrives on momentum, not maintenance. When that momentum fades, even a superpower scrambles to hold loyalty. Taiwan’s advantage lies in persistence and authenticity; values that continue to resonate across regions wary of dependency and coercion.
As the Honduran election nears, Beijing’s anxious gestures tell a story louder than any official statement: When friendship must be bought before every vote, it might not be friendship at all.
Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos is a Honduran journalist based in Taipei. His work on China-Taiwan-Latin America relations has appeared in Nikkei Asia, The Diplomat and the Taipei Times.
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