A large majority of Taiwanese favor strengthening national defense and oppose unification with China, according to the results of a survey by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC).
In the poll, 81.8 percent of respondents disagreed with Beijing’s claim that “there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China,” MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-chieh (梁文傑) told a news conference on Thursday last week, adding that about 75 percent supported the creation of a “T-Dome” air defense system.
President William Lai (賴清德) referred to such a system in his Double Ten National Day address, saying it would integrate air defenses into a more efficient network.
The survey also found that nearly 80 percent of respondents believe that Taiwan and China are not subordinate to each other and support the government’s crackdown on public servants who obtain Chinese identification documents.
Unlike polls conducted by partisan think tanks, one commissioned by the MAC should, in principle, be politically neutral. However, the sample size — about 1,000 respondents — is relatively small, and it is unclear whether their political affiliations or attitudes toward cross-strait relations are representative of the broader public. However, if the results could be viewed as broadly indicative, Taiwanese across party lines appear to support increased defense spending and reject unification with China.
This sentiment could reassure those concerned about the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) election of Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) as party chair. The KMT holds a legislative majority, and Cheng has said she does not support raising defense spending to 5 percent of GDP — a target proposed by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Her stance has sparked concerns that Taiwan might not be prepared to defend itself in the face of growing Chinese military pressure.
If KMT supporters share the public’s apparent belief in the need for stronger defense, Cheng might eventually soften her position or engage in dialogue with the DPP on defense funding.
However, Cheng has also expressed skepticism toward what she calls “overreliance” on the US, saying she opposes spending heavily on US-made weapons. This presents another challenge, as part of the proposed T-Dome architecture would rely on US systems.
Greater self-reliance in defense production is a worthy goal, and Taiwan could pursue it by investing more into local weapons development. At the same time, procurement of foreign arms should emphasize cost-effective, asymmetric capabilities that maximize deterrence at lower cost.
Naturally, Taiwan should continue to strengthen defense cooperation with the US, Japan and other friendly democracies. However, partnerships should focus on joint training, intelligence sharing and interoperability, while maintaining a domestic defense base that can sustain itself in wartime.
Washington has repeatedly called for Taipei’s participation in joint military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region, and Taiwan should seek to join them. Meanwhile, it must stockpile precision missiles, drones and critical munitions to prepare for possible conflict scenarios.
Another step is ensuring communications resilience. Taiwan should invest in secure communications systems capable of linking its forces with those in Japan and the Philippines, given Beijing’s track record of damaging undersea cables. In the event that China disrupts Taiwan’s access to global networks, the government should be able to receive information through secure satellite channels and relay it domestically.
Most Taiwanese oppose subjugation by Beijing. That sentiment must translate into policy. The KMT and DPP should put aside politics and focus on turning Taiwan into an unassailable fortress — one that deters aggression through readiness, resilience and unity.
Friendly relations with China are desirable, but peace cannot depend on goodwill alone. As the ancient adage reminds us: If you want peace, prepare for war.
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