In 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled that the exclusion of Pingpu from the Indigenous Peoples Status Act (原住民身分法) was unconstitutional — a delayed reckoning with a forgotten history. On Oct. 17, the Legislative Yuan passed its third reading of the Pingpu Indigenous People’s Identity Act (平鋪原住民族群身分法). It was a long-awaited response to a 20-year struggle for recognition from Pingpu groups and a milestone in Taiwan’s transitional justice process.
The question is whether legal recognition could truly provide genuine protection of rights. There is discussion on the likelihood of this separate legal framework — which acknowledges identity first and leaves rights to be debated later — creating a second-tier indigenous class. The decoupling of identity and rights would be a low-budget form of recognition at best. The acid test for the credibility of the legal changes would be what happens in the education system. The recognition of Pingpu groups brings three major challenges — and opportunities for reform — for education in Taiwan:
The first challenge is resource allocation. As hundreds of thousands of indigenous Pingpu potentially claim recognition, would the budgets and special admission quotas for indigenous education be diluted to the point of insignificance? This question is a cause of genuine concern among indigenous communities. It would be a slap in the face of any notion of transitional justice if the government leaves marginalized groups to compete among themselves under the pretext of “limited national resources.” Taiwan instead should see this moment as an opportunity to expand investment in indigenous education and address injustices. It is the time for determination to expand the pie, not a zero-sum resource scramble that pits ethnic groups against one another.
Second is the question of the curriculum. History textbooks have long painted Pingpu as a Sinicized or “disappeared” ethnic group, but this cannot remain with their existence recognized in law. What this change should not look like is simply appending a paragraph. Instead, Taiwan can reform and decolonize the curriculum’s systematic Han-centric standpoint, affirming the key and agentic position of Pingpu in its history. It would give next generations the chance to learn that Taiwan’s story was never one of a single voice.
Third is the challenge of teacher training. Who will teach this new curriculum? The teacher training system has serious gaps, and most teachers have little to no knowledge of the culture or history of Pingpu groups. That risks teachers unintentionally re-running stereotypes in the classroom and causing further damage to students with Pingpu heritage. It is essential that courses on ethnic relations and historical justice in Taiwan become a mandatory component of teacher training, and that teachers are upskilled as a matter of urgency.
Legal recognition is a first step, but the road ahead is long. The question is how to go about transforming an education system that has long neglected indigenous voices. The answer would serve as a touchstone for the integrity of Taiwan’s commitment to transitional justice.
Taiwan must avoid legislation that creates a situation in which there are different rights within the same ethnic group, and it should in the long term return to a singular status for a given identity. This is not just an issue for the Pingpu, but for all Taiwanese. How exactly the Pingpu are treated would define what kind of nation this is.
Ultimately, it is through education that Taiwan might prosper as a multicultural and just society.
Chou Hui-min is an educational researcher.
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
Former Taipei mayor and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) founding chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) was sentenced to 17 years in prison on Thursday, making headlines across major media. However, another case linked to the TPP — the indictment of Chinese immigrant Xu Chunying (徐春鶯) for alleged violations of the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法) on Tuesday — has also stirred up heated discussions. Born in Shanghai, Xu became a resident of Taiwan through marriage in 1993. Currently the director of the Taiwan New Immigrant Development Association, she was elected to serve as legislator-at-large for the TPP in 2023, but was later charged with involvement
RSS