Speaking about security arrangements between the Philippines and other like-minded nations, and how these arrangements might benefit Taiwan, Renato Cruz de Castro, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellow at National Chengchi University, smiled and said, “We are neighbors.”
De Castro made the remarks during an interview on the online platform Taiwan Talks about the possibility of a hub-and-spokes strategy, centered on the Philippines. He said that Visiting Force Agreements (VFA) have already been ratified with the US, Australia and Japan; signed with New Zealand; and are under negotiation with Canada, France and Italy. The UK and South Korea had expressed interest in signing similar accords.
Yesterday’s incident of a China Coast Guard ship ramming a Philippine vessel in the South China Sea was just the latest example of why Manila is keen to sign VFAs, and why countries near and far, with an interest in keeping the South China Sea open to shipping, are lining up to be on the list.
Taiwan is not on that list. Despite the obvious need for such integration in the evolving regional security landscape, Taiwan does not have official relations with any of those countries.
Taiwan has no official relations with India, either, and yet in the article “Taiwan: India’s distant neighbor,” on this page on Oct. 11, Rup Narayan Das noted that Indian civil society has moved increasingly closer to Taiwan, and further from China, which India actually neighbors.
“Neighbor” means more than geographical proximity; it also entails affinity. Being a neighbor does not always imply neighborliness; the opposite is also true.
Taiwan has long held close relations with Japan: both words, “neighbor” and “neighborly,” apply.
Sanae Takaichi, the newly elected president of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party and the presumptive Japanese prime minister, has said that Taiwan is an important friend of Japan’s, and called it an “extremely important partner and a valued friend” in a written response to a Hudson Institute questionnaire on Oct. 1.
Takaichi maintains good relationships with senior Democratic Progressive Party figures such as President William Lai (賴清德) and Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) and has visited Taiwan several times recently. On one of these occasions, during a visit in late April, Takaichi proposed a “quasi-security alliance” between Japan, Taiwan, Europe, Australia and India to build a stronger network to protect each other. She did not say from who, exactly. We know who she meant.
Takaichi is a protege of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, who was the first Japanese politician to voice concern that a contingency in the Taiwan Strait was a contingency for Japan. Like Abe, she has consistently called on Japan to reinforce its military capabilities. Like many political figures of countries with security arrangements with the US, she has expressed concerns over US President Donald Trump’s administration, hence the idea of the “quasi-security alliance.”
We would not know if Takaichi will be elected as the new Japanese prime minister until at least Oct. 20. If elected, she would have practical constraints because of her need to engage with China, and again, none of the nations on her list have official relations with Taiwan, so such an alliance might be difficult to get off the ground. That said, as political commentator Rath Wang (王健智) writes in “What Takaichi means for Taiwan” on today’s page, the withdrawal of the pacifist Komeito on Friday from the Japanese government coalition and the possibility of cooperation with other parties stronger on defense could well strengthen Takaichi’s hand on national security arrangements.
Taiwan would certainly benefit from integration into a regional security alliance, but even if it is technically left out, there are reasons it could benefit from the Philippines-centered hub-and-spoke idea.
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