The recent demand by US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick that Taiwan invest massively in the US and shift up to 50 percent of its semiconductor production abroad must be called what it is: coercion masquerading as partnership. Far from strengthening Taiwan’s security, such a move would dismantle Taiwan’s most vital defense asset: the “silicon shield.”
Taiwan’s unrivaled dominance in advanced semiconductors is not just an economic fact; it is our strategic lifeline.
This so-called silicon shield ensures that the world depends on Taiwan, making it indispensable to allies and a dangerous gamble for adversaries. It is our deterrent, our leverage and our survival mechanism in a hostile geopolitical environment.
Yet Washington’s proposal would directly erode this shield. Stripping Taiwan of its production dominance would dilute our indispensability and make us more vulnerable, not less. A Taiwan that no longer controls the core of global semiconductor supply chains is a Taiwan that risks becoming expendable in the calculus of great powers.
What is most disturbing is the lack of logic at the heart of Lutnick’s demand. On the one hand, Washington insists it seeks to defend Taiwan. On the other, it pressures Taiwan to weaken the very mechanism that deters aggression. This contradiction is dangerous. It suggests that the US views Taiwan less as a strategic partner and more as a subcontractor to be drained for US interests.
Realism in international politics teaches us that survival depends on power, leverage and self-help — not on abstract promises. For Taiwan, semiconductors are our power and our leverage. To give that up in exchange for vague reassurances would be an act of self-destruction.
If Washington truly cares about Taiwan’s survival, it must recognize that weakening our silicon shield is tantamount to undermining the very rationale for defending us.
Taiwan is asked to pour billions of US dollars into US projects with no proportional security guarantee in return. If such demands persist, they would corrode trust and cast doubt on the credibility of the US’ commitments.
Destroying Taiwan’s silicon shield will not make the world safer. It will make Taiwan more vulnerable, embolden aggressors and destabilize the global balance of power. If Washington wishes to be seen as a reliable partner, it must abandon these coercive tactics and pursue genuine collaboration — through joint research, talent exchange and concrete security guarantees.
Simon H. Tang is an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton, who lectures on international relations.
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