Taiwan is a key economic and technological partner for India, as New Delhi has repeatedly affirmed over the years. Likewise, India has been an important partner and a priority country for Taiwan under its New Southbound Policy. Yet in recent times, this enthusiasm has waned.
US President Donald Trump’s unpredictable policies and rapid shifts have kept everyone on their toes, but does this justify a loss of momentum? Absolutely not. If anything, it should be a reason for Taiwan and India to double down on advancing their ties.
India has been actively working to maintain and clarify its position on Taiwan. When Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) visited India last month and attempted to insert a reference to Taiwan in the Chinese readout, manipulating India’s stance on Taiwan and its “one China” policy, India made its position clear that there has been no change to its Taiwan policy. This underscores that India-Taiwan relations are now distinct from India-China relations. There is clear political will to continue strengthening the partnership, and the China factor has been effectively minimized.
Political gridlock in Taiwan, coupled with the demands of managing relations with the US, has prevented the country from fully focusing on the New Southbound Policy and engaging with “like-minded” nations in the region. This neglect is detrimental to Taiwan’s long-term interests. To be fair, President William Lai (賴清德) inherited a difficult domestic situation, in which his Democratic Progressive Party no longer had a majority in the legislature, and navigating relations with the US under Trump has only added to the pressure. However, rather than treating this as a crisis to be managed, Taiwan could see it as an opportunity to strengthen regional partnerships and demonstrate its commitment. In this context, relations with India are particularly important.
Several points need to be clearly understood in Taiwan. First, an India-China thaw does not impact India’s ties with Taiwan. India does not affirm a “one China” policy, and even when it adhered to the formulation in the past, Taiwan was never part of that framework.
Second, India values strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, and Taiwan is firmly embedded in India’s strategic thinking, economic calculus and policy approaches.
Third, even low-effort initiatives could bring tangible benefits for Taiwan, aligning with India’s expectations without creating unnecessary friction. Yet, mentions of India as a key partner remain absent from Taiwan’s official discourse.
Engagement must also move beyond governments. India has a vibrant media and strategic community, and Taiwan should reach out more actively. While Taiwan’s lobbying is often impressive, especially in the US, it falls short in India, where targeted engagement with media and think tanks could achieve much more. Taiwanese officials and ministers should capitalize on Indian media interest in Taiwan to tell their story more effectively. Neglecting this outreach would be another missed opportunity.
India, too, must raise its game. Injecting political momentum would serve it well. For instance, sending a deputy minister or minister of state to the recently concluded Semicon Taiwan — where stakes are relatively low, but potential returns are high — would have been beneficial and entirely within the scope of the “unofficial” relationship.
Restricting engagement to senior officials might seem safe, but “playing safe” is ineffective when the returns are limited, especially when Taiwan has little incentive to share its semiconductor expertise and resources. In an era of give and take, India has mastered transactional and issue-based cooperation; the same approach should extend to Taiwan. Encouraging parliamentary delegation visits and exploring a trade agreement would also signal seriousness, particularly if India is committed to reducing its massive trade deficit with China. Diversification could and should begin with Taiwan.
Both countries would also benefit from forging sister city agreements, particularly since Indian states have greater autonomy in engaging with Taiwan, and many already host substantial Taiwanese investments. Reviving the Taiwan-India parliamentary friendship forum is equally important. Limiting interactions among democratically elected representatives should have no place between two democracies in the Indo-Pacific region.
Finally, none of these initiatives would reach their full potential without direct connectivity. Resuming direct flights and expanding tourism between the “hidden gem” and “heart” of Asia — Taiwan — and “Incredible India” is essential to deepening people-to-people ties.
India and Taiwan stand at a pivotal moment. With targeted engagement, stronger political will and renewed connectivity, the two democracies could transform decades of missed opportunities into a vibrant, mutually beneficial and defining partnership. The foundation is already in place, what is needed now is strategic vision to ensure that this year marks a new chapter in Taiwan-India relations.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. Views expressed here are personal.
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