The meaning of “one China” has undergone a decisive transformation. What once revolved around the question of who held China’s seat at the UN has expanded into a system of political and economic compliance. Beijing no longer seeks recognition alone; it expects adherence to the rules of its own design. “One China” has become less a diplomatic formula and more an instrument to reshape the foundations of globalization.
It is in this context that India’s recent statement carries particular weight. In 1949, India became the first non-socialist state to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC), framing that decision as part of anti-colonial solidarity and Asian unity. For then-Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, recognition was not a tactical calculation, but an expression of postcolonial idealism, grounded in the belief that the PRC’s inclusion in the UN would stabilize Asia and amplify the moral authority of the developing world. Even after the 1962 border war, India did not revoke recognition, reflecting Nehru’s conviction that representation was distinct from rivalry. At that time, “one China” meant representation alone.
Today, the setting is profoundly different. The international system is no longer defined by newly independent states seeking legitimacy, but by a sharpening contest between two powers. The US struggles to defend its industrial base, while China wields production scale and supply chains as leverage. India, whose manufacturing ambitions are still in the making, sees clearly the danger of allowing representation to slide into rulemaking. To acquiesce would be to accept a global order tilted toward Chinese dominance, where US resilience and India’s economic future would be constrained before they fully mature. It is this awareness that underscores the importance of New Delhi’s present position.
During Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi’s (王毅) visit to New Delhi, he publicly declared that India recognized Taiwan as part of China. Within hours, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs issued an unequivocal clarification: “The Chinese side raised the issue of Taiwan. Our position remains unchanged. Like many other countries, we have economic, technological and cultural exchanges with Taiwan, and even China itself maintains such exchanges.”
This statement achieved two objectives. First, it reaffirmed that India continues to recognize Beijing as the government of China, consistent with the policy adopted in 1949. Second, it explicitly rejected the expanded interpretation that Beijing seeks to attach to “one China.” By pointing out that even Beijing engages with Taipei in similar domains, New Delhi exposed the overreach in China’s narrative. The line was sharply drawn; recognition does not equate to subordination.
China’s strategy has unfolded gradually yet deliberately. What began as a question of representation has progressively transformed into conditionality embedded in market access. States seeking deeper economic ties with China have increasingly been required to accommodate Beijing’s position on Taiwan as the price of entry.
The experience of Lithuania, subjected to coercive trade restrictions after permitting a Taiwanese representative office to operate under the name “Taiwan,” illustrates the punitive dimension of this practice. Similarly, the Czech Republic was warned of diminished business opportunities following high-level exchanges with Taipei, while several African governments were threatened with curtailed financing and infrastructure projects should they accept Taiwanese aid or official visits. Taken together, these cases underscore how “one China” has been recast from diplomatic recognition to an instrument of structural leverage, compelling states to adjust their external behavior to access the Chinese market.
This transformation has been quiet rather than confrontational. Step by step, “one China” has shifted from a diplomatic formula to a market access condition and then into a bid to define international norms. What emerges is a super “one China” that insists not only on sovereign recognition, but also on Beijing’s authority to police the terms of engagement.
Washington has interpreted this trajectory as a direct challenge. Under US President Donald Trump, high tariffs have been deployed not merely to revive US manufacturing, but also to block Beijing from converting its market scale into regulatory dominance. Tariffs on imports combined with incentives for reshoring serve two functions: bolstering the US industrial base and encouraging partners to reduce reliance on China. Within this framework, South Korea and Vietnam have accelerated collaboration in semiconductors and artificial intelligence. These initiatives represent the early stages of a third supply chain model, designed to prevent Beijing from exploiting industrial overcapacity and pricing leverage to entrench its influence.
Against this backdrop, India’s intervention gains even greater significance. The dispute over Wang’s claim was not about semantics, but about sovereignty in rulemaking. India drew a decisive line. It would continue to uphold its 1949 recognition of the PRC, but it would not concede its strategic autonomy by endorsing Beijing’s expansion of “one China.”
The distinction is fundamental. To recognize Beijing as China is diplomacy, an established convention within India’s foreign policy. To let Beijing write the rules is strategic surrender, a capitulation that legitimizes authoritarian control. The former preserves freedom of choice. The latter opens the door to domination, which India would never accept.
Lin Hsiao-chen is an assistant professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies. She is currently a visiting fellow at ORF America in Washington, supported by a fellowship from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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