Public discourse surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China tomorrow and Monday has been characterized by widespread misconceptions concerning both the state of India-China relations and the broader strategic environment. As Modi travels to Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, it is imperative to delineate what this visit signifies, and what it does not.
A persistent challenge in analyzing India’s foreign policy lies in its frequent misinterpretation through the prism of great power competition. New Delhi’s diplomatic decisions are often read predominantly as reactions to Washington or Beijing, rather than as the outcome of autonomous strategic calculations. Such framing obscures the rationale of India’s approach, which is predicated upon the principles of agency, strategic autonomy and the prioritization of national interest.
The timing of Modi’s visit, amid intensifying trade frictions with the US, has engendered speculation regarding India’s strategic orientation. Nonetheless, India’s engagement with China does not indicate a deterioration of India-US relations or its lack of interest in the Indo-Pacific region. Crisis management and negotiations continue, and both India and the US remain indispensable strategic partners. Short-term divergences do not negate this reality.
However, Modi’s visit is undeniably consequential. It constitutes his first visit to China in seven years, following a prolonged chill in bilateral relations after the Galwan clashes. Contrary to popular perception that US trade tensions have driven India closer to China, efforts to stabilize India-China relations have been continuous since Galwan.
Diplomatic and military channels were never fully suspended, and the present limited thaw reflects sustained, incremental engagement aimed at managing tensions, preventing escalation and preserving strategic flexibility. Modi’s participation in the SCO summit exemplifies this cautious bilateral engagement, which is necessary given the risks of continued hostility without credible collective deterrence.
India’s engagement in multilateral platforms such as the SCO and BRICS serves a broader purpose. India approaches these forums with a clear strategic intent: to engage constructively while safeguarding its sovereignty. While China and Russia might attempt to instrumentalize these platforms to advance an anti-US narrative, India’s participation ensures that alternative voices are preserved and that dialogue continues. Its opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative further illustrates this careful balance of engagement and resistance.
This calibrated multilateral approach complements India’s assertion of autonomy. India promptly issued clarifications when China referenced Taiwan in the Mandarin transcription following Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi’s (王毅) visit, and it continues to resist SCO formulations that disregard cross-border terrorism concerns. By linking bilateral thaw, multilateral diplomacy and principled action, India demonstrates a coherent strategy of engaging with China while maintaining its core interests and strategic independence.
The underlying drivers of tension between India and China remain largely unchanged. The principal sources of discord, including the protracted boundary dispute, a pronounced trade imbalance, recurrent military standoffs and China’s deepening strategic partnership with Pakistan, which has intensified following recent India-Pakistan confrontations, persist.
These challenges are largely independent of the US and are unlikely to be resolved through multilateral optics alone. Interpreting Modi’s visit as signaling the erosion of the Indo-Pacific construct, a rupture with the US, or India’s acquiescence to China is analytically flawed and empirically unsubstantiated.
Modi’s visit should be seen in the context of India’s broader strategic vision. New Delhi has invested significant political capital in strengthening the Indo-Pacific architecture, from deepening Quad cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia to expanding defense and economic ties across ASEAN and Europe. These efforts are concrete commitments to maritime security and resilient supply chains, while also reaffirming India’s support for a rules-based international order.
Engagement with China does not weaken these partnerships; rather, it reflects the practical recognition that managing a complex bilateral relationship is both compatible with and essential for advancing strategic objectives. India shows that engagement and deterrence can be pursued at the same time.
India continues to maintain its partnership with the US, while seeking to stabilize relations with China and engaging with regional partners. India is not being drawn into the orbit of any single power; it is exercising strategic agency, and navigating a complex and evolving regional environment through deliberate and often challenging policy choices.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. The views expressed here are personal.
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