Former CIA director and retired US Army general David Petraeus on Monday participated in a forum hosted by the Hudson Institute think tank, at which he discussed lessons Taiwan can learn from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a close observer of the Ukraine war, Petraeus pointed out the deep influence the war has had on global military strategy — specifically in the Asia-Pacific region.
China is closely watching developments in Ukraine and drawing lessons from them, so it is crucial that Taiwan take note of three battlefield lessons and prepare.
The first lesson is: Deterrence must not fail. The key factor driving the outbreak of the Ukraine war was the failure of deterrence. Ukraine was inadequately prepared before the war and the international community did not provide sufficient military support in time. This led Russian President Vladimir Putin to believe that he could quickly reach his strategic objective, prompting the invasion.
Taiwan must learn that deterrence is more than merely showcasing military abilities. It also involves demonstrating a clear determination to defend and firm international cooperation and support. Taiwan must establish a defense posture that conveys its resolve to resist, while deepening defense cooperation with allies, to ensure deterrence power is sufficient to prevent a potential invasion.
Second, Taiwan must accelerate the modernization of its military and the deployment of uncrewed systems. The Ukraine war has illustrated that conflicts will be dominated by the use of uncrewed systems. From reconnaissance and strikes to logistical support, autonomous and automated technologies will play a key role. Taiwan could learn from Ukraine’s innovations in this area — using drones for precise strikes on Russian armored vehicles, deploying uncrewed maritime systems to sink enemy ships and utilizing smart drones to target key infrastructure.
Taiwan should make large-scale investments in such systems and explore algorithm-driven autonomous defense technologies to prepare for potential conflicts.
Third, Taiwan must bolster overall societal resilience and wartime preparedness. Being an island nation, Taiwan would face significant obstacles in receiving timely and feasible external support in the event of a conflict. Determining how to effectively stockpile strategic materials, improve the protection of critical infrastructure and diversify energy sources are critical issues that it must face. Ukraine has successfully maintained the continuity of its defense efforts by improving infrastructure defenses, pre-positioning strategic resources and establishing a robust social logistics network. Taiwan should comprehensively improve its energy resilience, conduct extensive inventory of its underground defense facilities, and consider how to address the potential energy disruptions and material shortages that would arise during a cross-strait conflict.
Only by thoroughly understanding the experiences from the battlefield in Ukraine and swiftly putting the lessons into practice can Taiwan ensure stable self-defense in an increasingly complex security environment.
Liao Ming-hui is an assistant researcher at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
Taiwanese pragmatism has long been praised when it comes to addressing Chinese attempts to erase Taiwan from the international stage. “Taipei” and the even more inaccurate and degrading “Chinese Taipei,” imposed titles required to participate in international events, are loathed by Taiwanese. That is why there was huge applause in Taiwan when Japanese public broadcaster NHK referred to the Taiwanese Olympic team as “Taiwan,” instead of “Chinese Taipei” during the opening ceremony of the Tokyo Olympics. What is standard protocol for most nations — calling a national team by the name their country is commonly known by — is impossible for
India is not China, and many of its residents fear it never will be. It is hard to imagine a future in which the subcontinent’s manufacturing dominates the world, its foreign investment shapes nations’ destinies, and the challenge of its economic system forces the West to reshape its own policies and principles. However, that is, apparently, what the US administration fears. Speaking in New Delhi last week, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau warned that “we will not make the same mistakes with India that we did with China 20 years ago.” Although he claimed the recently agreed framework
The Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) on Wednesday last week announced it is launching investigations into 16 US trading partners, including Taiwan, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to determine whether they have engaged in unfair trade practices, such as overproduction. A day later, the agency announced a separate Section 301 investigation into 60 economies based on the implementation of measures to prohibit the importation of goods produced with forced labor. Several of Taiwan’s main trading rivals — including China, Japan, South Korea and the EU — also made the US’ investigation list. The announcements come
Taiwan is not invited to the table. It never has been, but this year, with the Philippines holding the ASEAN chair, the question that matters is no longer who gets formally named, it is who becomes structurally indispensable. The “one China” formula continues to do its job. It sets the outer boundary of official diplomatic speech, and no one in the region has a serious interest in openly challenging it. However, beneath the surface, something is thickening. Trade corridors, digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence (AI) cooperation, supply chains, cross-border investment: The connective tissue between Taiwan and ASEAN is quietly and methodically growing