The proposed inclusion of Chinese shipping giant COSCO in Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison’s (長江和記實業) contentious global ports sale is a potential win for Beijing in a strategic sector, but the deal is far from final and could face resistance from Washington, sources and analysts said.
Since the deal was announced on March 4 to sell 43 of CK Hutchison’s ports in 23 countries, including two along the Panama Canal — to a consortium led by US firm BlackRock and Italian billionaire Gianluigi Aponte’s family-run shipping company MSC — it has sparked a firestorm of criticism from China. While the US government might oppose the inclusion of state-run COSCO over perceived geopolitical risks posed by Chinese influence, bringing in the shipping giant could provide a more level playing field rather than one company being dominant, a person with knowledge of the deal said.
The complex deal would require approval from about 50 jurisdictions involved, and it would take at least two years for the process to be completed, sources and analysts said.
There was no immediate response from the White House, COSCO and CK Hutchison to Reuters’ requests for comment. At a time of festering global trade tensions between China and the US, the deal showcases the growing rivalry between both sides for maritime influence in the strategic commercial shipping sector that has been dominated by China in recent decades.
US President Donald Trump had earlier called for the removal of Chinese ownership in the Panama Canal — now used for more than 40 percent of US container traffic valued at US$270 billion annually. Following months of pressure from Beijing, including Chinese state media lambasting the move as a betrayal and various Chinese government departments saying they would conduct a legal review, CK Hutchison on Monday announced that a Chinese investor was being courted.
It also said changes to the composition of the consortium and structure of the transaction would be necessary to secure regulatory approval.
Two sources with knowledge of the matter told Reuters the investor was COSCO — a shipping and ports conglomerate that is now one of the world’s dominant, vertically integrated marine transportation firms.
While any stake by COSCO is not yet clear, a triparty agreement with BlackRock and MSC would alleviate China’s national security concerns and have its blessing, the sources said.
“The potential acquisition of Hutchison Ports is driven by the strategic need to secure key port resources amid global competition and US-China tensions,” JPMorgan wrote in a research report.
The report also noted that while the inclusion of COSCO would “relieve some concerns by the Chinese government, thus boosting the likelihood of a green-light scenario,” not all ports in the original agreement might be included.
COSCO is requesting a bigger stake, while the other parties in the consortium are keen to keep it a minority, the sources said.
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) told reporters on Monday in response to a question on the deal that Beijing “will conduct lawful regulation, firmly safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests, and uphold justice and fairness in the market.”
A deal involving COSCO would be a “loud reaffirmation of China’s geopolitical influence across the global maritime trade and transport sector, and of its effective leverage in trade negotiations with the US,” said Isaac Kardon, senior fellow for China studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“Beijing’s disapproval clearly forced Hutchison to back off and change tack — and not merely in the optics of the transaction, but in its basic structure and national ownership,” he added.
Should the deal proceed, it would be a crucial off-ramp for CK Hutchison, with the Americans wary of COSCO’s growing maritime heft that could undermine US national security. There could also be further blowback amid ongoing and complex bilateral trade talks.
Some analysts say the Panama ports, in particular, would be a focus for the Trump administration, and could be taken out of the transaction to meet US strategic interests.
“The inclusion of this behemoth Chinese central state-owned enterprise as an owner seems like it should be a non-starter for the Trump administration seeking to strip Chinese control and restore some kind of American suzerainty over the Canal Zone,” Kardon said.
The CK Hutchison assets up for sale span the globe, including ports in Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Barcelona in Spain, Felixstowe in the UK, Mexico, Poland and the Bahamas — enlarging Beijing’s global shipping networks and options at a time of great trade and tariff uncertainties.
“At the moment they [Beijing] are in a place generally where they want to assert themselves and say, hey, don’t mess with us,” said Andrew Cainey, a senior associate fellow with the defense and security think tank Royal United Services Institute in London.
“If the US were to come back and object to it, China could try to block the deal or demand more [from CK Hutchison],” he said.
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