Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) was an important figure in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), holding the position of general secretary from 1980 to 1987 and briefly serving as chairman from 1981 to 1982. As a protege of former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), Hu was a strong proponent of political and economic reforms, and advocated for the rehabilitation of those who suffered during Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) Cultural Revolution. He is fondly remembered as a reformist leader who championed freedom of speech, anti-corruption initiatives and limited democratic reforms, earning him admiration from students and intellectuals throughout China.
Hu in May 1980 led a working group from the CCP Central Committee to visit and inspect Tibet. During this visit, he did three unprecedented things that earned him lasting respect among Tibetans, who fondly referred to him as Sku-zhabs Hu, or “Gentleman Hu.”
First, he publicly acknowledged the failure of CCP policies in Tibet. Second, he called for reducing the overwhelming presence of Chinese cadres, who dominated all political and military institutions in the region. Third, he proposed a six-point plan aimed at letting Tibetans “truly be the masters of their own lives.”
These initiatives were welcomed by many Tibetans, but as Tibetan historian Tsering Shakya noted, Hu’s progressive stance was criticized by CCP conservatives for being too radical and undermining China’s authority over Tibet.
Hu’s reformist vision extended beyond Tibet. He was deeply respected by Chinese who hoped for greater political openness. However, his support for student-led protests in 1986, which called for political reform and an end to corruption, led to his downfall. Branded as a proponent of “bourgeois liberalization,” Hu was forced to resign as general secretary in January 1987.
When Hu died on April 15, 1989, students gathered to mourn him. Their mourning soon transformed into a broad pro-democracy movement demanding political reform, transparency and civil liberties. While Tiananmen Square became the epicenter of this iconic student-led uprising, Tibet was also witnessing a resurgence of resistance demanding political freedom. Inspired in part by the Dalai Lama’s five-point peace plan, which he presented to the US Congress in 1987, Tibetan protests intensified between 1987 and 1989.
The Chinese government responded harshly.
Martial law was declared in Lhasa in March 1989, just one month before a similar repression descended in Tiananmen Square. Between March and June 1989, the CCP crushed Tibetan calls for independence and freedom, and students’ demands for democracy and reform.
The death of Hu and the crushing of the mass protest from Lhasa to Tiananmen Square highlight the similar grievances shared by Tibetans and young Chinese, and the CCP’s readiness to crush such dissident voices.
The crackdown led to the entrenchment of a new dictatorship led by conservatives such as former Chinese presidents Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and Jiang Zemin (江澤民), and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). These leaders have systematically eliminated the memory of and desire for freedom and democracy through ideological indoctrination, mass surveillance and suppression of dissent.
Today, Tibet and Tiananmen Square are regarded as sensitive areas, leading to the establishment of extensive surveillance and security measures, including arbitrary detention. In Tibet, the situation is more severe due to the introduction of colonial boarding schools, which aim to completely erase Tibetan identity.
Dolma Tsering is a post doctoral researcher at National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University’s Department of Humanities and Social Sciences.
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