The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command on Tuesday once again gathered its army, navy, air force and rocket force to conduct joint military exercises around Taiwan.
It also published a series of propaganda videos on Weibo, with one titled “Subdue Demons and Vanquish Evils,” which simulated missile attacks on Taiwan and featured scenes of Taipei 101.
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian (朱鳳蓮) said the exercises were resolute punishment for President William Lai’s (賴清德) administration’s “rampant ‘independence’ provocations.” It is undeniably clear that China is using military force to confront our country and advocate for the use of non-peaceful means to endanger Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Article 2 of the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法) defines the term “foreign hostile force” as “countries, political entities or groups that are at war with or are engaged in a military standoff with the Republic of China,” and includes “countries, political entities or groups that advocate the use of non-peaceful means to endanger the sovereignty of the Republic of China.” Time and time again, China has resorted to using verbal and military intimidation against Taiwan.
Furthermore, Article 8 of China’s “Anti-Secession” Law specifically stipulates the use of “non-peaceful means” to prevent “Taiwan’s secession from China.” As such, there is absolutely no doubt that this clearly aligns with the definition of “foreign hostile force” defined under the Anti-Infiltration Act.
The term “foreign hostile force” is not only stipulated in the Anti-Infiltration Act — it is also outlined in Part 2, Chapter 2, Article 115-1 of the Criminal Code (中華民國刑法), which states that punishments for treason also apply to “offenses committed in Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, or any hostile foreign forces, or to the agents thereof.”
Articles 2 and 3 of the National Security Act (國家安全法) also stipulate that no individual may engage in certain acts on behalf of “a foreign country, Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, foreign hostile forces or various organizations, institutions, or groups established or substantially controlled by them or the persons dispatched by such organizations, institutions or groups.”
Taiwan’s legal framework consistently places China, Hong Kong, Macau and foreign hostile forces on the same regulatory level. Additionally, the language used in the penal provisions outlined in articles 32 to 34 of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act (國家機密保護法) also fall within this framework.
Within the legal system, placing China, Hong Kong, Macau on the same regulatory level as foreign hostile forces equates to categorizing them as foreign hostile forces. Therefore, Taiwan’s legal framework already designates China, Hong Kong and Macau as foreign hostile forces.
This is not a definition Lai set himself — it is the law of the land. The authority to change this definition lies only with China itself. Only when China acknowledges Taiwan as an independent, sovereign state, gives up using non-peaceful means against the nation and stops endangering our sovereignty would it no longer be considered a foreign hostile force. Otherwise, it would remain as such.
Li Chin-i is head prosecutor at the Taichung branch of the Taiwan High Prosecutors’ Office.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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