This year marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the India-Taipei Association and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in India — a milestone that should not be overlooked. Over the past three decades, relations between Taipei and New Delhi have flourished, with Taiwan’s presence in India expanding and cooperation growing across multiple sectors. However, one area remains underdeveloped — semiconductors. Despite ongoing discussions, that vital sector demands greater attention and action.
Various reasons have been cited for the slow progress in that field, but the core issue is clear: Taiwan is not fully leveraging its strengths in foreign policy. Taiwan is synonymous with semiconductors and it should capitalize on that reputation — not just in its partnerships with the US and Europe, but also in its engagement with India.
Although Taiwanese companies such as Foxconn and Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp have made valuable contributions, those efforts fall short of what is needed to elevate Taiwan-India relations. Taiwan’s chip giant, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC), continues to prioritize the West or focus inward. Meanwhile, discussions about India’s perceived challenges, such as infrastructure gaps and sustainability concerns, persist in Taiwan. Yet, India’s semiconductor mission, with the centrality of Taiwan in it and backed by substantial subsidies, demonstrates clear intent and potential. Taiwan has a window of opportunity — the question is whether it would seize it.
India is eager to partner with Taiwan and its leadership has been vocal about that, unlike many world leaders who still view discussing Taiwan openly as a taboo. Yet, that proactive stance remains underappreciated.
For the first time in a long while, India has leadership that recognizes the value of partnering with Taiwan and the mutual benefits such cooperation could bring. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often referenced his 1999 visit to Taiwan, highlighting the personal connection he feels to the nation and the lessons he learned from its best practices — lessons he has expressed interest in applying to India. Taiwan, too, views India as a key partner. The alignment of leadership in the two nations at this moment presents a rare and timely opportunity to strengthen ties.
India has welcomed semiconductor leaders from Taiwan and created an environment conducive to collaboration, particularly through its production-linked incentive schemes. The robust support provided by central and state governments is evident. In fact, news has emerged that Gujarat, Modi’s hometown, plans to establish its first overseas office in Taipei to attract investment in the semiconductor and technology sectors. Taiwan’s involvement in India’s semiconductor industry is already visible, such as the nation’s active participation in India’s annual Semicon event, where SEMI Taiwan plays a pivotal role.
As India aspires to manufacture “Made in India” chips and develop its semiconductor sector further, there is no denying that Taiwan is a natural partner — and that the time is ripe to elevate that partnership, shifting from discussion to action.
The Executive Yuan’s economic diplomacy task force has greenlit initiatives aimed at strengthening Taiwan’s chip diplomacy with Japan and European nations, but India should be a central player in that strategy, a move that would not only expand Taiwan’s regional influence, but also align with its New Southbound Policy.
While India grapples with a massive trade imbalance and navigates China’s economic weaponization, Taiwan has a crucial role to play. That is what democracies should do — support each other and contribute to mutual growth. Taiwan must take bold steps and place its bet on India — increase investment in the nation, train Indian engineers in Taiwan, establish semiconductor programs in collaboration with Indian universities and take TSMC to India.
That partnership would benefit Taiwan and India. Taipei, too, would stand to gain. As the nation deals with an aging population and a shrinking workforce, and is seeking foreign talent amidst demographic challenges, India’s skilled labor force in the semiconductor industry could help alleviate some of those pressures.
As interdependence deepens, the stakes would rise. The relationship should not be purely transactional, but the realities of geopolitics — shaped increasingly by conflicts and nations prioritizing their strategic interests — make foreign policy a delicate balance of give and take. In that context, goodwill and mutual respect are essential for sustaining and advancing ties. Fortunately, Taiwan and India already share those qualities.
India is shedding its past hesitations and viewing Taiwan through a fresh lens — recognizing it as a vital economic and technological partner. In turn, Taiwan should reconsider outdated perceptions of India. The crux is simple: India is on a growth trajectory and the world wants to be part of its rise. Why should Taiwan be any different? To foster holistic cooperation, semiconductor collaboration must lie at the heart of the partnership. India fully recognizes Taiwan’s irreplaceable role in its semiconductor journey and envisions even deeper collaboration between the two nations.
Deepening the Taiwan-India partnership — what I refer to as the “partnership of the future” — holds the potential to reshape the trajectory of the Indo-Pacific region. It would not only expand existing areas of cooperation, but also make Taiwan-India relations stronger, more resilient and truly formidable.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. The views expressed here are her own.
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