Recent media reports have highlighted a critical national security case that concluded last year, revealing retired Taiwanese military personnel recruited by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were tasked with gathering intelligence on key military installations and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), and, alarmingly, were implicated in a plot to establish an armed assassination unit.
That case represents an unprecedented escalation in the PRC’s infiltration tactics. The PRC’s evolving strategies, from manipulating internal narratives and employing “gray zone” tactics, to planning assassinations, underscore its intent to destabilize Taiwan’s institutional and societal frameworks. That progression reflects a deliberate and systematic approach to undermining Taiwan’s sovereignty and disrupting its social fabric. The involvement of retired military officers suggests potential contraventions of Criminal Code provisions on sedition and treason.
The scope of the intelligence-gathering activities not only threatens Taiwan’s national security, but also endangers the security of international entities such as the AIT. Those have profound implications for Taiwan’s diplomatic relations, undermining the confidence of allied nations and the international community. They also challenge the stability of global support for Taiwan, a cornerstone of its defense against authoritarian aggression.
To mitigate the growing risks associated with PRC recruitment efforts, Taiwan has adopted a multi-faceted approach that includes penalty reforms, judicial training, and the enhancement of information security protocols.
Amendments to the National Security Act (國家安全法) have been introduced to enhance punitive measures for individuals found guilty of betraying the nation. Those include the suspension of retirement benefits immediately upon a guilty verdict at the first trial, thus preempting continued engagement in activities detrimental to national security during the judicial process.
The 2019 amendments to the Criminal Code, specifically Article 115-1, address cases of collaboration with the PRC regime, further reinforcing the legal framework to counter external threats.
Additional articles added to the National Security Act (國家安全法), the National Intelligence Service Act (國家情報工作法), the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法), and the Classified National Security Information Protection Act (國家機密保護法) mandate specialized training for judges presiding over national security cases. Those programs are designed to ensure judicial proficiency in addressing complex national security challenges and to align judicial decisionmaking with national security imperatives.
Data compiled by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research showed stark disparities in sentencing for military espionage cases. The average sentence for convicted military spies in Taiwan is 18 months, compared with 230 months in Western democracies. That leniency is further evident in broader national security cases, where offenders often receive sentences of just six months’ imprisonment, with many permitted to substitute fines for custodial terms.
Such judicial rulings significantly undermine deterrence, diminishing the effectiveness of legal reforms and sentencing enhancements. They emphasize the urgent need for a more comprehensive understanding of national security complexities within the judicial system to ensure proportionate sentencing and robust deterrence against acts that threaten national sovereignty and security.
Taiwan’s mechanisms for managing classified information remain insufficiently robust, as evidenced by recurrent incidents of sensitive information leaks involving high-level officials. Therefore, to address these vulnerabilities, the development of a comprehensive security clearance protocol is essential.
That protocol involves periodic assessments of personnel with access to classified information, encompassing evaluations of criminal and drug records, mental health, financial stability and potential susceptibility to foreign influence.
The integration of the “need-to-know” principle within this framework aims to enhance operational security while expediting the identification and dismantling of criminal networks in the event of security breaches.
Military personnel serve as the foundation of national security, bearing the trust and expectations of Taiwanese. Their failure to fulfill that duty not only constitutes a moral and ethical breach, but also inflicts significant harm on societal values and national interests.
The ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party, remains resolute in its commitment to safeguarding national security, addressing treasonous acts with uncompromising rigor and fortifying the structural resilience of Taiwan’s institutions against external threats.
Chen Kuan-ting is a member of the Foreign and National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan. He was previously special assistant to former president Tsai Ing-wen, chief executive officer of the Taiwan NextGen Foundation and a researcher in the National Security Council. Gahon Chiang is a congressional staff member in the office of Legislator Chen Kuan-ting, focusing on Taiwan’s foreign policy.
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