Cargo ships registered to Chinese shipping companies have allegedly destroyed undersea cables in a chain of instances across the globe, including the deliberate severance of multiple undersea cables in the waters outside Keelung Harbor by the Shunxing-39 (順興三九) before quickly leaving the area, making cross-national maritime policing particularly difficult to implement.
How do we enable processing and follow-up mechanisms to operate more effectively, let alone establish an early warning messaging system? How do we establish advanced maritime policing laws and conventions with friendly and like-minded nations nearby? These are an urgent priority that our national security departments must immediately focus on.
In mid-November last year, two undersea fiber-optic communications cables in the Baltic Sea were destroyed. The crew of the China-registered Yi Peng 3 (伊鵬三號) bulk carrier ship turned off the ship’s onboard automatic identification system, which tracks its travel. It reportedly used its anchor in Swedish waters on Nov. 17 to snag and sever the communications cable linking Sweden and Lithuania.
The next day, it apparently again dragged its anchor along the seafloor to sever a second communications cable linking Germany and Finland. The ship in question was registered in Ningbo, China. Its captain is Chinese, and one of the crew members is Russian. The ship departed from Ust-Luga, Russia, carrying chemical fertilizers destined for China.
With the Russo-Ukrainian war ongoing, NATO national security departments suggested Russia was the ringleader behind the scenes, immediately grabbing the attention of authorities in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Lithuania and other countries.
The Yi Peng 3 was first intercepted by the Royal Danish Navy, which demanded that the bulk carrier anchor in the international waters of the Kattegat Strait separating Sweden and Denmark. Hampered by international maritime law, NATO authorities were unable to force the Yi Peng 3 to stop in a designated harbor for an investigation, leading to a month-long foreign diplomacy impasse.
Diplomatic mediation behind the scenes became a point of political tension between NATO and Beijing. Sweden was first to demand that investigators be allowed to board the China-registered vessel to carry out a criminal investigation. China did not agree to the Chinese crew members being questioned by foreign judicial personnel.
In the end, a compromise was hammered out where China would lead the investigation. At the same time, the crew would be subject to a Swedish-led accident investigation carried out by third-party representatives and observers, who would “hold talks” with the crew. Germany and Finland were invited to send observers, and one Danish representative was allowed aboard.
The Swedish personnel in charge of the agency investigating the accident said they were satisfied with being able to board the Yi Peng 3 and conduct interviews. The process was relatively open and transparent, and they were able to access and see what they wanted to investigate, and to discuss what they wanted with the crew.
A spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was adamant in stating that although China gave permission to Sweden, Germany and Finland to use their observer status to carry out the investigation, the right to lead the investigation remained with the Chinese side. Even though both sides maintained their own versions of what happened, the investigation concluded on Dec. 19, and the Yi Peng 3 was allowed to leave the Kattegat Strait.
The undersea cable severance incident in the Baltic remains unclear, and is particularly sensitive due to the involvement of NATO, Russia and China. NATO officials are by no means brushing off the threat to national security posed by these cable severances. They have directly identified that this case falls under NATO countries’ right to collective defense, as stipulated within Article 5 of the organization’s treaty.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has urged a show of strength in the Baltic by “bolstering military presence” to protect coastal critical infrastructure and strategic assets.
The Yi Peng 3 incident could serve as a reference for Taiwanese authorities in how to respond to the Shunxing-39 cable severances.
Chen Yung-chang is a freelance writer based in Taipei.
Translated by Tim Smith
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