The US Department of Defense recently released this year’s “Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” This annual report provides a comprehensive overview of China’s military capabilities, strategic objectives and evolving global ambitions. Taiwan features prominently in this year’s report, as capturing the nation remains central to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) vision of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” a goal he has set for 2049. The report underscores Taiwan’s critical role in China’s long-term strategy, highlighting its significance as a geopolitical flashpoint and a key target in China’s quest to assert dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.
Beijing has several options for absorbing Taiwan, ranging from large-scale military actions to more targeted and covert approaches. China has outlined conditions under which it might consider using military force, including a formal declaration of Taiwan’s independence, moves toward independence, internal unrest, Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, prolonged delays in cross-strait unification dialogue or foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs. These conditions highlight Beijing’s sensitivity to actions it perceives as undermining its claims to sovereignty or escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
Among its military strategies, a full-scale amphibious invasion represents the most complex and risky option. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Joint Island Landing Campaign envisions coordinated air, naval and logistical operations to establish beachheads and capture key targets. However, such an operation faces significant challenges, including urban warfare, attrition and the risk of international intervention. The immense political and military risks make this approach less appealing unless Beijing deems it absolutely necessary.
The risk of high casualties and logistical challenges of an amphibious invasion have prompted Beijing to explore alternative strategies, such as precision missile and airstrikes on critical government and military infrastructure, including radar sites, air bases and communication systems. While these actions aim to weaken Taiwan’s defenses and leadership, they also risk escalation and international backlash.
Beijing could employ covert tactics, including infiltrations by special operations forces (SOF) or activating a fifth column already embedded in Taiwan. These operations could disrupt critical infrastructure, degrade public confidence in leadership and weaken Taiwan’s resolve. To enhance their effectiveness, such campaigns would likely be combined with economic and political subversion, along with overt and clandestine information operations, amplifying their impact on Taiwan’s stability.
Blockades have emerged as a frequently discussed strategy for Beijing to isolate Taiwan and exert pressure. By deploying the PLA Navy alongside its maritime fishing fleet and militia, China could position thousands of ships in the Taiwan Strait, creating significant challenges for US and allied naval operations. A Joint Blockade Campaign could cut off vital air and maritime imports, and could be supported by electronic warfare, cyberattacks and information operations to disrupt Taiwan’s infrastructure and influence international narratives.
Beijing might target smaller offshore islands, such as the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands, 東沙群島), Itu Aba (Taiping Island, 太平島), or Lienchiang or Kinmen counties. Seizing these islands would demonstrate military capability and resolve while avoiding the complexities of a full-scale invasion. However, such actions carry significant risks, including international opposition, emboldened pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, and direct conflict resulting in personnel and hardware losses.
These measures, aimed at compelling Taiwan’s capitulation, could also strain China’s economy by disrupting its own imports and exports, and risking US-led countermeasures, such as energy blockades. Prolonged blockades or escalations could further intensify resistance among Taiwan’s populace and potentially spiral beyond Beijing’s control, undermining its broader strategic objectives.
Beijing employs a range of pressure tactics to target Taiwan. Over the past two years, the PLA has intensified military pressure by expanding its presence around Taiwan, conducting large-scale naval and air operations, and carrying out frequent incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). According to the Ministry of National Defense, the PLA conducted 1,641 ADIZ entries in 2023, slightly down from 1,733 in 2022, while crossings of the Taiwan Strait median line increased to 712 in 2023 from 552 the previous year. High-profile military exercises, such as those following then-president Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) 2023 transit through the US or visits by senior US officials such as former US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi, further underscore Beijing’s intent to project dominance and punish perceived provocations.
Apart from overt military actions, Beijing relies on subtler and less costly measures, including diplomatic maneuvers, political subversion and information operations. These tactics, often cloaked in a veneer of legality, are difficult for Taiwan and the US to counter, and are already in active use. Cyberattacks are another critical component of Beijing’s strategy, targeting Taiwan and its allies to disrupt infrastructure and weaken defenses. These operations could escalate into advanced cyber, electronic and space warfare, crippling Taiwan’s systems and forcing capitulation while deterring or delaying US intervention.
Beijing might consider nuclear first use if a conventional defeat in a Taiwan conflict threatened the survival of the Chinese Communist Party regime. Concerns over the potential US use of low-yield nuclear weapons against a Taiwan invasion fleet have prompted Chinese officials to advocate for proportionate response capabilities. The DF-26, China’s first nuclear-capable missile system with precision strike capability, is considered the most likely platform to field a low-yield warhead in such a scenario.
Despite its rapid modernization and military expansion, the PLA acknowledges significant shortcomings in its warfighting and command capabilities, particularly in areas critical to a Taiwan invasion, such as urban warfare and long-distance logistics. Challenges with decentralized command are highlighted by the “Five Incapables” (五個不會) slogan, which criticizes officers’ inability to judge situations, interpret orders, make decisions, deploy troops or handle unexpected events. To address these issues, the PLA introduced a new training system in 2021 aimed at enhancing exercise realism and developing officers skilled in joint operations.
Many of Beijing’s tools, such as cyberattacks, and military and diplomatic pressure, are already in active use. However, its decisionmaking in a Taiwan contingency hinges on a complex calculus of factors. These include international and domestic political conditions, the economic impact of potential sanctions, Taiwan’s political climate and confidence in the PLA’s ability to execute a successful operation.
China’s strategy also depends on its assessment of US willingness to intervene militarily and the likelihood of global support for punitive sanctions and economic isolation. The question of whether, when and how Beijing might pursue Taiwan’s annexation is further complicated by uncertainties, such as the potential impact of the second term of US president-elect Donald Trump, which adds an additional layer of unpredictability to Beijing’s calculations.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, studies national defense at the American Military University.
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