A shipment of 38 M1A2T Abrams tanks ordered from the US arrived at the Port of Taipei on Sunday. A second shipment of 42 tanks is scheduled for next year, with another 28 arriving in 2026 — a total of 108.
Their acquisition represents a significant enhancement to the nation’s defense capabilities, not just as a symbol of military might, but as a strategic asset crucial to Taiwan’s security.
With its advanced technology, superior firepower and robust armor, the M1A2 Abrams is a significant improvement on Taiwan’s US-made M60A3 and indigenously developed CM11 tanks, which have been in service for close to 40 years.
It has been said that Taiwan should not procure big, heavy symmetric platforms, such as tanks, but prioritize acquiring asymmetric platforms, such as anti-ship missiles, mobile air defense systems, mines and drones, which are quicker to deploy than traditional military hardware, cost-effective and could be used in ways that leverage Taiwan’s natural geographic advantages, while targeting the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) vulnerabilities.
While that is true, this is a particular case, as tanks are a unique asset. Even under the asymmetric paradigm, they would still be crucial for the nation’s defense. If there is an attempted invasion and some PLA forces successfully land on Taiwan, the M1A2 Abrams would spearhead the counterattack to take back territory.
Indeed, while 10 of the tanks would remain at the army’s Armor Training Command, the rest would be deployed to the 584th Armored Brigade in Hsinchu County’s Hukou Township (湖口) and the 269th Brigade stationed in New Taipei City’s Linkou District (林口). These brigades would be responsible for anti-landing missions to ensure the safety of the Port of Taipei and Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, which would be targets for an invading force to establish a lodgement — a fortified area secured by military force — to allow for the continuous landing of troops and material.
The tanks’ operational use would leverage its strong firepower, armor and advanced technology in a swift counterattack aimed at pushing back the invading force, preventing it from establishing a lodgement. This approach is particularly vital during the critical moments when Chinese troops would be most vulnerable, transitioning from air or sea to land.
These mobile defense tactics would also involve the tanks maneuvering to engage any light mechanized units that might accompany the PLA’s amphibious assault.
As Institute for National Defense and Security Research research fellow Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲) said: In the event of a PLA landing operation, Taiwan has five lines of defense. The first is anti-ship missiles, the second is mobile artillery rocket systems, the third is combat helicopters such as the AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and the fourth is coastal defense missiles. The fifth and final line of defense is comprised of tanks and ground forces.
It is also important that the military’s conventional platforms, such as tanks, are up-to-date and high-quality, and that military personnel continue to improve training and tactics. When operated correctly, the M1A2 is an important and useful platform.
However, these tanks are just one part of a bigger picture of ongoing military reforms. The military must continue its push toward an asymmetric defense strategy, which leverages the nation’s strengths, is cost-effective, exposes the PLA’s operational weaknesses, and makes an invasion attempt extremely costly and logistically challenging. This is exactly what Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (顧立雄) — only the nation’s third civilian defense minister — has been tasked to do.
The positive trajectory of the nation’s military reforms enhances national security and stability in the region.
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