A great many actors had a hand in the fall of Syria’s dictator, Bashar al-Assad: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Islamist group that led the offensive; Turkey, which nurtured and supported Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; the myriad Syrian groups and people who gave a hated tyrant a final push.
However, al-Assad’s fall was also the work of a dead man, Yahya Sinwar.
When Sinwar ordered Hamas’ attack on Israel in October last year, he meant to revolutionize the Middle East. Today, the region is being remade, just not as Sinwar intended: An astonishingly successful Israeli offensive has left Hamas and the rest of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” in ruins and has now claimed al-Assad as its latest victim.
The Hamas fighters who streamed into Israel on Oct. 7 last year were after more than an orgy of rape, kidnapping and murder. They also sought to shatter Israel’s security and start a multi-front war that would destroy the Jewish state.
For a time, it seemed to be working. Israel was sucked into a grinding, globally unpopular war in Gaza. Its northern territory was depopulated because of attacks by Lebanese Hezbollah. The Houthis of Yemen bankrupted the Israeli port of Eilat through attacks on Red Sea shipping. Iran fired missiles and drones at Israeli cities.
This was all seen, by many Israelis, as an existential challenge, but by revealing Israeli weaknesses, Sinwar ended up unleashing Israeli strengths.
Fourteen months on, Hamas has been devastated and its leaders killed, including Sinwar. Hezbollah has been badly bloodied — and forced to accept a ceasefire — by exploding pagers, airstrikes and an Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon. Iranian missiles did not cause much damage to Israel, but the Israeli response shredded Iran’s air defenses and deeply embarrassed the regime.
Now Syria, a keystone of Iran’s regional strategy, has fallen as the indirect result of Israeli blows.
For years, support from Iran, Hezbollah and Russia sustained al-Assad.
However, Russia has been drained and distracted by war in Ukraine, while Iran and Hezbollah have taken a drubbing from Israel. That opened the door for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to launch its decisive assault against the regime, which became another unintended casualty of Sinwar’s genocidal dream.
The result is a true revolution in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Syria was Iran’s conduit to Hezbollah and its oldest ally in the Middle East. Al-Assad’s fall deprives Tehran of strategic depth and reach; it severely complicates the task of rebuilding a proxy network that has been badly mauled.
His departure is also a humiliation for Russia, which had claimed the intervention that saved al-Assad in 2015 as a great victory over the West. By imperiling Russian bases on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, it threatens Moscow’s ability to project power into Africa, as well.
This is why Israel is such a vital ally for the US: Because its victories are critical defeats for Washington’s enemies. And this Middle Eastern revolution might not be over yet.
Israel and the US have a chance to further squeeze Iran in the coming months. Tehran has lost its best anti-aircraft systems and the strategic insurance policy Hezbollah and other proxies were meant to provide. Now it faces an incoming US president, Donald Trump, likely to dial up the economic coercion — through sanctions meant to make Iran reverse its nuclear program or perhaps cause the implosion of the regime. Tehran could even face a strike on its nuclear facilities, if Israeli leaders decide this is the moment to press the advantage.
That is not to say the Middle East is entering a bright new era of peace. The collapse of al-Assad’s regime could cause a revival of the Islamic State, the emergence of a jihadist regime in Damascus, or a descent into chaos that affects the entire region.
The fate of al-Assad’s remaining chemical weapons is uncertain, which is why the Israeli Air Force is hunting them right now. US-Turkey relations could get very tense, if the Turks seize the opportunity to attack Syrian Kurdish groups loosely allied to Washington. And although Iran is in parlous position, it still has cards to play.
The Houthis could intensify their assault on freedom of the seas if they get anti-ship cruise missiles from Moscow. Iran could tighten its grip on Iraq through the Shiite militias that give it sway there. Or perhaps an Iran that feels cornered will make a dash for nuclear weapons, confronting the new US administration with a choice between acquiescing and starting the big Middle Eastern war Trump has pledged to avoid.
For now, the regional balance of forces is more favorable to the US, Israel and their allies than at any time in a generation. Sinwar is likely to be remembered as the author of a murderous surprise attack that soon boomeranged in epically counterproductive ways.
That is not the legacy Sinwar sought on Oct. 7 last year, but it is one he richly deserves.
Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Brands is also a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a member of the US Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board. He is a senior adviser to Macro Advisory Partners. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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