Four days after Double Ten National Day, China announced a new round of military exercises around Taiwan titled “Joint Sword-2024B.” As the name implies, Monday’s exercises are a follow-up to its “Joint Sword-2024A” exercises in May, which were ostensibly a response to the content of President William Lai’s (賴清德) inauguration speech, but, as the title suggests, were intended to routinize large-scale military exercises around Taiwan.
International observers in general viewed Lai’s National Day speech as restrained and measured.
“Lai’s speech demonstrated restraint, refraining from breaking new ground, repeating well-known positions,” Council on Foreign Relations research fellow David Sacks said.
These exercises raise the question of what is driving Beijing’s repeated escalations and what it hopes to achieve, as it is clear that it is not in response to anything Lai says. Beijing has clearly switched up its strategy toward Taiwan this year by ramping up pressure on the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration, as it knows that with the opposition having a majority in the legislature — led by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) — it can pressure the leadership from within Taiwan’s political system.
China has been “slowly, but surely” increasing the pressure around the nation, normalizing patrols and regularly encircling Taiwan by air and sea, Navy Commander Admiral Tang Hua (唐華) told The Economist last week.
Beijing wagers that increasing pressure on Taiwan would undermine social cohesion and resilience, and would spur opposition politicians to increase criticism and hostility toward the government, breaking down political functioning. While fundamentally these exercises are a result of Beijing’s political weakness and a reminder that its strategy of winning Taiwanese hearts and minds has failed, they presage a more dangerous future.
Beijing appears to favor there not even being an uneasy strategic equilibrium between the two sides in the Taiwan Strait. It is attempting to alter the “status quo,” providing its military with training while doing so. It is now more important than ever for the international community to help shore up deterrence against Chinese military aggression.
China’s exercises are providing the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with training at the tactical and operational level to impose a quarantine or blockade.
“[The PLA is] simulating how to cut off Taiwan’s air and sea traffic to the outside world and prevent Taiwan’s naval and air forces from being mobilized,” Association of Strategic Foresight research fellow Chieh Chung (揭仲) said.
These also have a significant psychological component, as it makes it harder for Taiwanese forces to detect when Beijing would switch from exercises to war, Tang said.
“Their capacity to switch from exercises to war is really strengthening,” one senior official told the Financial Times on Thursday.
Beijing’s escalation should be a wake-up call to Taiwanese society, DPP Legislator Chen Kuan-ting (陳冠廷) said on Thursday.
“Indifference to large-scale military drills undermines Taiwan’s security,” Chen said. “China’s military exercises are not just meant to make Taiwanese people feel anxious or worried, but rather to desensitize us.”
These exercises should spur society to boost civil defense preparedness, he said, adding that “it is not just about being aware of the drills, but knowing how to act if they escalate into conflict.”
It is important for society to come together and firmly convey to China that its attempts to divide Taiwanese society are a political dead end. It also highlights the importance of freedom of navigation of the US and allied countries to prevent Chinese attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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