The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is pressuring Taiwan using high intensity tactics to tire out Taiwanese forces and force them into making mistakes, The Economist cited Navy Commander Admiral Tang Hua (唐華) as saying in an interview published on Thursday last week.
China is “using an ‘anaconda strategy’ to squeeze the island,” he said, adding that it is “slowly, but surely” increasing its presence around the nation.
“They are ready to blockade Taiwan at any time they want,” Tang said.
It is welcome to see a high-level official give an interview to international media on this matter. Although Taiwan is one of the most reported on topics in media today, there is little representation of high-level Taiwanese officials and strategic thinkers talking about what they see as the primary strategic challenges the nation faces. It is only natural that what Taiwanese officials view as the nation’s most pressing challenges might differ from how the strategic situation looks to others.
China’s tactic appears to be to press intensive, continuous, multi-layered and comprehensive “gray zone” pressure — acts below the threshold of war — on the nation. These are no doubt part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) “struggle theory,” or douzheng, the idea that conflict is necessary to achieve political goals.
Beijing’s hassling and harrying of other nations has also been occurring in the South China Sea, such as the China Coast Guard using water cannons on Philippine boats and beating 10 Vietnamese fishers near the disputed Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands, 西沙群島).
Beijing’s strategy is challenging for Taiwan for three interrelated reasons:
The first is that the massive disparity in capability and Taiwan’s lack of a credible “deterrence by denial” means that China has “escalation dominance,” so once Beijing has shifted the “status quo” to its favor, it would be difficult for Taipei to re-establish deterrence.
This feeds into the second challenge, which is that China is seeking to tire out Taiwan’s forces, forcing them into making a mistake, which could give Beijing what it thinks is a propaganda tool to put in front of the international community as a justification to escalate the conflict.
“Taiwan adopts the pure defensive posture that is derived from the disparity of national comprehensive power, and the pursuit of international sympathy and support,” Institute for National Defense and Security Research assistant research fellow Chung Chih Tung said on the nation’s strategy against Beijing’s “gray zone” tactics.
As Taiwan prioritizes peace and does not want to give China any kind of casus belli, no matter how spurious, Beijing’s provocations are met with a de-escalatory response, complicating efforts to restore deterrence.
The third is that it has so far proved difficult for the nation to establish a domestic consensus on how to respond to Beijing’s aggressive actions, with many leading figures in the pan-blue camp believing that Taiwan should adopt a more accommodative policy on China, such as by making concessions on defense spending and reducing international engagement with other democracies. However, the lack of a consensus makes Beijing feel emboldened to continue its “anaconda strategy,” as it clearly believes these “gray zone” actions, whether by undermining public morale or boosting the voices of politicians seeking a more accommodative stance, further its political objective.
As military theorist and historian Basil Liddell Hart said: “The military objective is only the means to a political end.” The government should consider ways to undermine China’s belief in the political efficacy of its pressure, such as by boosting transparency on Beijing’s threats, trusting that greater public awareness would only strengthen Taiwanese resolve to resist.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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