Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) on Tuesday thanked legislators in the US House of Representatives for passing the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act. The bill would empower the US government to publish the “illicit” financial assets of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members and “restrict financial services for certain immediate family of such officials,” in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
US Representative French Hill, who introduced the bill last year, said the legislation would put public pressure on the CCP, and could act as a deterrent to Chinese aggression toward Taiwan.
Beijing “has failed to deliver a social safety net and families are battered by sinking real-estate debt,” Hill said. “Let these corrupt officials explain to ordinary Chinese citizens how they acquired their riches on a government salary.”
Hill’s support for Taiwan is very welcomed, but his estimate of the bill’s impact is overly optimistic. To start, where would the US Department of the Treasury publish the information? Access to international media in China is limited under the CCP’s censorship.
The social media and content platforms most widely used in the US, including Facebook, X, Instagram, Twitch and YouTube, are all blocked in China. Content posted to Chinese social media such as Sina Weibo, WeChat and Douyin is also monitored by the CCP, and even code language — using intentionally misspelled words and homophones — that users employ to get around restrictions is quickly picked up by censors and removed. Those who persist in posting banned subject matter find their accounts blocked, and in the most egregious cases are imprisoned.
However, that is a moot point, as Chinese citizens are largely aware of corruption in their government already, but are powerless to act on that information.
Even outside of China, CCP members do not even attempt to hide illegal or questionable behavior, as three examples from 2022 demonstrate. Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye (盧沙野) said during an interview with French media on Aug. 3 that year that in the event of China’s annexation of Taiwan, Taiwanese would need to be “re-educated” to make them patriotic and accepting of unification.
This was followed by Chinese Ambassador to Australia Xiao Qian (肖千) smiling on TV while discussing the arrest of Australian activist Drew Pavlou in the UK over false charges, from which he was later absolved. Then in October 2022, a Hong Kong dissident was dragged onto the grounds of the Chinese consulate in Manchester, England, and beaten.
These sorts of actions are evidence that CCP officials care little what anyone knows or thinks about them. Financial restrictions could have more impact as a deterrent, but they need to be comprehensive and must target the CCP as a whole, which is outside the scope of the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act.
“This bill does not focus on retaliating against the Chinese government per se, but rather on individuals who are in that government,” Hill said.
It must be understood that in China there are no officials with individual interests, nor companies that can operate free from the CCP’s influence. In China, the party is everything.
To be effective, any legislation must threaten sanctions against China as a whole. Such legislation must entirely prohibit financial transactions, either direct or indirect, between tax-paying individuals or companies registered in the US and any entity in China.
Lessons from Russia show that to be effective, sanctions need to target trade funneled through third countries. US companies should also diversify their export partners and supply chains.
It is promising to see continued support for Taiwan’s defense from cross-party US officials, but legislation must promise truly impactful consequences to really serve as a deterrent to Chinese aggression.
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