Five countries have this year canceled visa-free entry for Taiwanese due to pressure from China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Tuesday. The number of countries offering preferential visa treatment to holders of Taiwan passports dropped from 171 at the end of last year to 166 in April, the Central News Agency reported, citing data from a report by the National Audit Office. Giving examples of countries mentioned in the report, it said that Botswana had removed Taiwan from the drop-down menu on its e-visa application system, while Colombia last year canceled visa-free entry for Taiwan passport holders.
It cannot be overstated how unimportant these changes are for Taiwanese travelers in general. A survey conducted by Insight-Xplorer Ltd showed that in 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, 69.1 percent of Taiwanese travelers visited countries in Northeast Asia other than China, 35.9 percent visited China (including Macau and Hong Kong) and 29 percent visited Southeast Asia. Only 2.6 percent visited South America and 0.9 percent visited Africa.
Ministry of Transportation and Communications statistics show that 4.9 million Taiwanese visited Japan that year, making it the top destination for local travelers, while 4 million visited China. Statistics for last year show that as travel recovered following the pandemic, the top destinations remained the same, with 4.23 million Taiwanese visiting Japan last year, and 1.76 million visiting China. Meanwhile, Botswana’s government data show that 1.18 million foreigners visited the African country last year, and nearly half of them were from other African countries.
So what does China hope to achieve by pressuring these countries into dropping visa-free travel for Taiwanese? Most likely, the measure is part of Beijing’s cognitive warfare efforts against Taiwan. China is running out of diplomatic allies to poach from Taiwan, so it is seeking to chip away at the nation’s international space in other ways. Botswana receives funding from China under the Belt and Road Initiative and has nothing to lose by canceling visa-free treatment for Taiwan, which was effectively nothing more than a symbolic policy to begin with. Colombia, while not a part of the Belt and Road Initiative, is a recipient of several Chinese investments and would be motivated to cancel agreements with Taiwan in favor of keeping those investments.
Elsewhere, Taiwan continues to enjoy favorable treatment. Taiwanese can travel visa-free to the US and the Schengen Area, and Taiwan last year signed the first agreement under the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade. Trade between the EU and Taiwan increased by 42 percent between 2020 and last year, then-European Economic and Trade Office head Filip Grzegorzewski said last month. So, there is little for Taiwanese to be concerned about. They can still travel to 166 countries without a visa (barely fewer than the 186 countries US citizens can travel to visa-free), and Taiwan is seeing relations improve with the countries that matter most to it.
The proper framing of this issue is important for countering China’s attempts to damage public morale. When reporting on the Taiwan-related policies of countries that are relatively insignificant to Taiwan in terms of trade and tourism, the foreign ministry should emphasize that while it regrets such decisions, it is focused on the meaningful and mutually beneficial relations Taiwan is engaged in with the US, the EU, Japan and other important partners. As the US is very instrumental in many of those relations, it is important that Taiwan continues to work closely with the US and seek its support in pursuing international agreements.
Ultimately, the government should encourage the US to formally recognize Taiwan, which could spur recognition by other countries. Failing that, Taiwan would continue to pursue closer non-official arrangements with other partners.
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