Taiwan has emphasized the importance of English education for years — notably, in the “Bilingual 2030” policy, which has been in place since 2017. This ambitious initiative aims to make English one of Taiwan’s official languages by 2030. As a member of Gen Z, I question the necessity of this policy: Is English education not already sufficient, and will making English an official language truly benefit Taiwanese society?
Taiwan’s English education system is more than adequate. English courses typically begin in the third grade and continue through high school, providing at least 10 years of instruction. Many children even start learning English in kindergarten. A 2018 Central News Agency report showed that nearly 70 percent of parents send their children to English cram schools. My own experience reflects this trend. I began learning English in kindergarten, and my elementary school offered English courses from the first grade, taught by local and native speakers.
If the quantity of English education is sufficient, why is there a push for the “Bilingual 2030” policy? In my view, the issue lies not in the amount of instruction, but in the methods used. Taiwan’s English education focuses heavily on grammar and writing, with insufficient emphasis on speaking. Additionally, Taiwan’s linguistic isolation makes it difficult for people to naturally use English in daily life.
While the “Bilingual 2030” policy aims to address these issues, I am afraid it might inadvertently increase social inequalities. Parents might feel pressured to enroll their children in additional courses, which could exacerbate social class disparities. Increased funding for English education could disproportionately benefit urban areas, widening the urban-rural gap.
Many students struggle with English despite extensive education. For instance, one of my relatives attended a bilingual kindergarten, but resisted learning English due to frustration. A classmate, overwhelmed by additional courses, showed no improvement. Another classmate, relying solely on school lessons, developed a dislike for English. These examples demonstrate how inappropriate education methods can lead to disinterest and frustration. The prevalence of cram schools also creates varying proficiency levels, complicating teachers’ efforts to provide uniform instruction.
Despite the challenges, the “Bilingual 2030” policy does bring potential benefits.
Improved public infrastructure — such as bilingual road signs, public transport announcements and official communications — fosters a more English-friendly environment. This not only aids local residents in practicing English naturally, but also makes Taiwan more welcoming to some international visitors and expatriates.
Nevertheless, to make English more prevalent, we should focus on refining our education methods. Rather than simply making English an official language, a balanced and inclusive education system that offers effective instruction and equal access to resources would better enhance English proficiency across all social groups.
While the “Bilingual 2030” policy promises valuable changes, its success hinges on tackling the core issue: the quality and accessibility of English-language education. Teaching methods must be refined to emphasize practical language use and ensure all students, regardless of background, have equal access to quality resources. Only then can Taiwan genuinely elevate its English proficiency without deepening social inequalities. Prioritizing these improvements over merely designating English as an official language would create a more linguistically capable and inclusive society.
Chen Ting-hsi is a student in the Department of International Affairs at Wenzao Ursuline University of Languages.
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