Today marks the 45th anniversary of the day the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was signed into law. The relationship between Taiwan and the US has evolved from the geopolitical turmoil of the time, marked by major Taiwanese tech companies establishing factories in the US, high-ranking Taiwanese military officials visiting the US and unprecedented arms sales to Taiwan.
What was once a one-sided dependence has metamorphosed into a mutually beneficial partnership. However, given the “asymmetrical” nature of cross-strait relations, especially the power disparity and China’s coercive tactics against Taiwan, it is essential and pressing to envision and enhance bilateral relations beyond the TRA, while acknowledging the challenges that lie ahead.
The TRA, providing both implicit and explicit security assurances, has no doubt become the bedrock of bilateral relations. An often-overlooked fact is that this law was meant to serve the people of Taiwan, regardless of the governing authority, and extends to any future administration in Taiwan (Section 15 of the act clarifies that “Taiwan” refers to “the governing authorities recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities.”)
Additionally, the act mirrors the US’ deep comprehension of Taiwan’s human rights situation at the time. It underscores the US’ commitment to human rights, especially for “all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan.”
The insight, wisdom and foresight of the US lawmakers at the time helped Taiwan transition to a full-fledged democracy. However, the TRA does not guarantee a frictionless democratic journey for Taiwan moving forward, without the risk of reverting to dictatorship. Today, China’s influence on Taiwanese society has grown and evolved. As such, the aim of Taiwan-US efforts should be not only to counteract military threats, but also to safeguard democracy. Actions with clear benefits should be given priority to alleviate any potential skepticism from the US.
To strengthen US-Taiwan relations in a practical manner, it is recommended to concentrate on the following three areas, all underpinned by fostering political commitment:
First, to strengthen Taiwan’s national defense, the US could consider broadening the range of arms sales to the country. This could include advanced weaponry, battleships and aircraft to dissuade China from underestimating Taiwan’s capabilities and to deter its erroneous assessment of invading Taiwan. One such consideration could be the F-35 jet.
While it might seem implausible, this aircraft could provide a significant advantage in establishing Taiwan’s air superiority. East Asian allies of the US, such as Japan and South Korea, are already equipped with this advanced fighter jet. Taiwan, however, has yet to acquire an aircraft that can match the performance of China’s latest fighter jets.
This situation could lead to a significant risk to Taiwan’s airspace during a first strike. If Taiwan were to lose air superiority, any conflict in the Taiwan Strait could escalate rapidly. Possible US military intervention, thus, could come with a steep cost.
Second, to fortify the bond between Taiwan and the US, regular ministerial and even high-level visits are invaluable and irreplaceable. Although the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA) has facilitated visits from numerous high-ranking US officials, there is still potential for enhancement. The very enactment of the TTA indicates that the US Congress perceived the communication framework between Taipei and Washington as antiquated and possibly inadequate for preserving regional peace. Without updating this structure to fit the challenging security situation in the region, communication gaps can cause misunderstandings of intentions and policies from both sides.
While there has been a slight easing in recent years, allowing Taiwan’s president to transit through the US, these visits are still transit in nature, limited in scope and duration, affecting communication with the US’ legislative branch, and restricting the potential benefits for the future development of Taiwan-US relations.
Washington should reaffirm its commitment to the TTA principles by thoughtfully seeking out more innovative strategies without contravening self-imposed restrictions.
Third, the potential of enhancing education exchanges between Taiwan and the US is often overlooked, underappreciated and underutilized. While the US continues to attract Taiwanese students, its allure is not as strong as it was half a century ago when young Taiwanese avidly sought education and career opportunities there. Lately, several US institutions have expanded into China by establishing satellite campuses — an initiative that could also be effective in Taiwan.
Taking inspiration from Harvard University, which sends students to National Taiwan University, would be a good initial step in fortifying educational ties. Clearly, deepening educational collaboration between Taiwan and the US can have economic upsides.
For example, successful individuals like Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang (黃仁勳), Advanced Micro Devices CEO Lisa Su (蘇姿丰) and Supermicro CEO Charles Liang (梁見後) began their education journey in Taiwan before continuing their studies in the US. Likewise, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) founder Morris Chang (張忠謀) received his education and early work experience in the US before starting his venture in Taiwan. TSMC has subsequently established branches in the US to manufacture advanced chips for Apple and Nvidia and created jobs for Americans. This underlines the economic value that the US can gain from enhancing education exchanges with Taiwan. Upgrading Taiwan-US talent cooperation is a measure worth considering and much needed.
Marking 45 years of the TRA, Taiwan and the US have made significant strides in their relationship. However, complacency is not an option. As we look to the next 45 years, it is evident that both nations must avoid resting on their laurels amid escalating threats and increasingly complex challenges.
The unpredictability and uncertainties associated with democratic systems and election cycles underscore the need to “institutionalize” exchanges and cooperation. By nurturing mutual understanding, managing achievable expectations, and launching new exchange and cooperation initiatives on existing and evolving platforms, both nations are setting the stage for high-level interactions in the foreseeable future.
This strategy would not only uphold the principles of the TRA, but also carve out a progressive vision for Taiwan-US relations. Being proactive, reassured actions can mitigate potential doubts about the US’ commitment toward Taiwan, and importantly, protect this beacon of democracy from the invisible weapons of authoritarian influences.
Lin Tzu-yao is from Kaohsiung and holds a master’s degree from National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of National Development, majoring in China studies and cross-strait relations. Cathy Fang is a policy analyst in the Project 2049 Institute.
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
After “Operation Absolute Resolve” to capture former Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, the US joined Israel on Saturday last week in launching “Operation Epic Fury” to remove Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his theocratic regime leadership team. The two blitzes are widely believed to be a prelude to US President Donald Trump changing the geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, targeting China’s rise. In the National Security Strategic report released in December last year, the Trump administration made it clear that the US would focus on “restoring American pre-eminence in the Western hemisphere,” and “competing with China economically and militarily
RSS