Today marks the 45th anniversary of the day the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was signed into law. The relationship between Taiwan and the US has evolved from the geopolitical turmoil of the time, marked by major Taiwanese tech companies establishing factories in the US, high-ranking Taiwanese military officials visiting the US and unprecedented arms sales to Taiwan.
What was once a one-sided dependence has metamorphosed into a mutually beneficial partnership. However, given the “asymmetrical” nature of cross-strait relations, especially the power disparity and China’s coercive tactics against Taiwan, it is essential and pressing to envision and enhance bilateral relations beyond the TRA, while acknowledging the challenges that lie ahead.
The TRA, providing both implicit and explicit security assurances, has no doubt become the bedrock of bilateral relations. An often-overlooked fact is that this law was meant to serve the people of Taiwan, regardless of the governing authority, and extends to any future administration in Taiwan (Section 15 of the act clarifies that “Taiwan” refers to “the governing authorities recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities.”)
Additionally, the act mirrors the US’ deep comprehension of Taiwan’s human rights situation at the time. It underscores the US’ commitment to human rights, especially for “all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan.”
The insight, wisdom and foresight of the US lawmakers at the time helped Taiwan transition to a full-fledged democracy. However, the TRA does not guarantee a frictionless democratic journey for Taiwan moving forward, without the risk of reverting to dictatorship. Today, China’s influence on Taiwanese society has grown and evolved. As such, the aim of Taiwan-US efforts should be not only to counteract military threats, but also to safeguard democracy. Actions with clear benefits should be given priority to alleviate any potential skepticism from the US.
To strengthen US-Taiwan relations in a practical manner, it is recommended to concentrate on the following three areas, all underpinned by fostering political commitment:
First, to strengthen Taiwan’s national defense, the US could consider broadening the range of arms sales to the country. This could include advanced weaponry, battleships and aircraft to dissuade China from underestimating Taiwan’s capabilities and to deter its erroneous assessment of invading Taiwan. One such consideration could be the F-35 jet.
While it might seem implausible, this aircraft could provide a significant advantage in establishing Taiwan’s air superiority. East Asian allies of the US, such as Japan and South Korea, are already equipped with this advanced fighter jet. Taiwan, however, has yet to acquire an aircraft that can match the performance of China’s latest fighter jets.
This situation could lead to a significant risk to Taiwan’s airspace during a first strike. If Taiwan were to lose air superiority, any conflict in the Taiwan Strait could escalate rapidly. Possible US military intervention, thus, could come with a steep cost.
Second, to fortify the bond between Taiwan and the US, regular ministerial and even high-level visits are invaluable and irreplaceable. Although the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA) has facilitated visits from numerous high-ranking US officials, there is still potential for enhancement. The very enactment of the TTA indicates that the US Congress perceived the communication framework between Taipei and Washington as antiquated and possibly inadequate for preserving regional peace. Without updating this structure to fit the challenging security situation in the region, communication gaps can cause misunderstandings of intentions and policies from both sides.
While there has been a slight easing in recent years, allowing Taiwan’s president to transit through the US, these visits are still transit in nature, limited in scope and duration, affecting communication with the US’ legislative branch, and restricting the potential benefits for the future development of Taiwan-US relations.
Washington should reaffirm its commitment to the TTA principles by thoughtfully seeking out more innovative strategies without contravening self-imposed restrictions.
Third, the potential of enhancing education exchanges between Taiwan and the US is often overlooked, underappreciated and underutilized. While the US continues to attract Taiwanese students, its allure is not as strong as it was half a century ago when young Taiwanese avidly sought education and career opportunities there. Lately, several US institutions have expanded into China by establishing satellite campuses — an initiative that could also be effective in Taiwan.
Taking inspiration from Harvard University, which sends students to National Taiwan University, would be a good initial step in fortifying educational ties. Clearly, deepening educational collaboration between Taiwan and the US can have economic upsides.
For example, successful individuals like Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang (黃仁勳), Advanced Micro Devices CEO Lisa Su (蘇姿丰) and Supermicro CEO Charles Liang (梁見後) began their education journey in Taiwan before continuing their studies in the US. Likewise, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) founder Morris Chang (張忠謀) received his education and early work experience in the US before starting his venture in Taiwan. TSMC has subsequently established branches in the US to manufacture advanced chips for Apple and Nvidia and created jobs for Americans. This underlines the economic value that the US can gain from enhancing education exchanges with Taiwan. Upgrading Taiwan-US talent cooperation is a measure worth considering and much needed.
Marking 45 years of the TRA, Taiwan and the US have made significant strides in their relationship. However, complacency is not an option. As we look to the next 45 years, it is evident that both nations must avoid resting on their laurels amid escalating threats and increasingly complex challenges.
The unpredictability and uncertainties associated with democratic systems and election cycles underscore the need to “institutionalize” exchanges and cooperation. By nurturing mutual understanding, managing achievable expectations, and launching new exchange and cooperation initiatives on existing and evolving platforms, both nations are setting the stage for high-level interactions in the foreseeable future.
This strategy would not only uphold the principles of the TRA, but also carve out a progressive vision for Taiwan-US relations. Being proactive, reassured actions can mitigate potential doubts about the US’ commitment toward Taiwan, and importantly, protect this beacon of democracy from the invisible weapons of authoritarian influences.
Lin Tzu-yao is from Kaohsiung and holds a master’s degree from National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of National Development, majoring in China studies and cross-strait relations. Cathy Fang is a policy analyst in the Project 2049 Institute.
The central bank and the US Department of the Treasury on Friday issued a joint statement that both sides agreed to avoid currency manipulation and the use of exchange rates to gain a competitive advantage, and would only intervene in foreign-exchange markets to combat excess volatility and disorderly movements. The central bank also agreed to disclose its foreign-exchange intervention amounts quarterly rather than every six months, starting from next month. It emphasized that the joint statement is unrelated to tariff negotiations between Taipei and Washington, and that the US never requested the appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar during the
The diplomatic dispute between China and Japan over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments in the Japanese Diet continues to escalate. In a letter to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, China’s UN Ambassador Fu Cong (傅聰) wrote that, “if Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression.” There was no indication that Fu was aware of the irony implicit in the complaint. Until this point, Beijing had limited its remonstrations to diplomatic summonses and weaponization of economic levers, such as banning Japanese seafood imports, discouraging Chinese from traveling to Japan or issuing
Since leaving office last year, former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has been journeying across continents. Her ability to connect with international audiences and foster goodwill toward her country continues to enhance understanding of Taiwan. It is possible because she can now walk through doors in Europe that are closed to President William Lai (賴清德). Tsai last week gave a speech at the Berlin Freedom Conference, where, standing in front of civil society leaders, human rights advocates and political and business figures, she highlighted Taiwan’s indispensable global role and shared its experience as a model for democratic resilience against cognitive warfare and
The diplomatic spat between China and Japan over comments Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made on Nov. 7 continues to worsen. Beijing is angry about Takaichi’s remarks that military force used against Taiwan by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” necessitating the involvement of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Rather than trying to reduce tensions, Beijing is looking to leverage the situation to its advantage in action and rhetoric. On Saturday last week, four armed China Coast Guard vessels sailed around the Japanese-controlled Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), known to Japan as the Senkakus. On Friday, in what
RSS