Vice President William Lai (賴清德), the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) presidential candidate, caused a stir by expressing his hope for Taiwan’s future president to visit the White House. Shortly after, the Financial Times, a reliable source for first-hand news from high-ranking officials, reported that Lai’s remarks have raised concerns in Washington, sparking a debate within Taiwan’s political circles and boosting the morale of US skeptics.
For decades, the US has been cautious in its interactions with Taipei, allowing only transit stops for the president and vice president of Taiwan. This practice, dubbed a “tacit agreement” by both sides, appears to be outdated and should be revisited.
Washington’s choice to not invite leaders or high-level Cabinets of Taiwan to visit the White House has been a self-restraint act, not prohibited by laws. Therefore, the stir may be an inflection point for US president Joe Biden to reconsider opening its doors to the second-in-command of Taiwan and give him the dignified reception he deserves.
By doing so, the US could practically demonstrate its commitment to supporting a beacon of democracy and set a precedent for other countries to break their own self-restricted, unspoken rules.
Taiwan’s vice president visiting the White House is not unprecedented. In the 1960s, then-vice president Chen Cheng (陳誠) visited the White House and was personally received by then-US president John F. Kennedy. Similarly, in the 1970s, vice president Yen Chia-kan (嚴家淦) visited the White House to congratulate then-US president Richard Nixon on his inauguration and had an official bilateral meeting with him.
However, since the US severed diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (ROC) in 1979, Taiwan’s vice president has not been received at the White House.
While the US had formal diplomatic relations with the ROC at that time, Taiwan was under the one-party dictatorship of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Ironically, after Taiwan completed its democratic transition in the 1990s, no Taiwanese president or vice president has since been received at the White House since. Is this not a double standard treatment of democracy and authoritarianism? It is timely to consider whether it is appropriate for the US — a staunch believer in democracy — to demonstrate its commitment to upholding this principle towards its democratic allies in such a way.
In 2018, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act, which allows “high-level Taiwanese officials to enter the US under respectful conditions and to meet with US officials, including officials from the Departments of State and Defense.”
Moreover, former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo abolished the state department’s travel guidelines on Taiwan in 2021 and strongly supported contacts between officials from both sides, with the goal of changing the nature of US-Taiwan interactions.
Unfortunately, under the Biden administration, progress on high-level interactions appears to be at a stalemate and a self-imposed restriction has been revived.
Is this self-restraint in line with an administration that places promoting democratic values high on its policy agenda? If this is not compelling enough, there is already legal authorization passed by both the Senate and the House of Representatives and signed by the president, so the US, as a country ruled by laws, should abide by it.
Given Beijing’s continued disregard for the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait, it might be time not only for Washington to revisit its policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) but to re-evaluate whether provoking China should still be an unwritten rule governing interactions between the two democracies.
Past experience has shown that Beijing does not reciprocate goodwill. The rescheduled visit to Taiwan by US House of Representatives Speaker Kevin McCarthy, which had been agreed upon by both sides, raises the question of whether such rearrangement would avoid crossing Beijing’s red line and in turn improve US-China relations or ease cross-strait tensions.
Chinese military aircraft and warships continue to engage in provocative actions in the Taiwan Strait with no signs of withdrawal, establishing a new normal in a strategic and effective manner.
In addition to external military pressure threatening Taiwan’s security, there are voices within the nation that are enlarging their base of inclination toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime, sowing the seed of tearing apart the society and eroding the trust between Taiwan and its only security guarantor, the US.
If the US takes a clearer position on opening the idea of Lai’s visit to the White House, those who are skeptical of the US’ intentions may have less resources to drive the wedge between the US and Taiwan. Conversely, if Washington stays ambiguous on its stance with establishing a more direct, higher-level channel with Taipei, it will only provide massive fuel for pro-China sentiment, raising the risk of Taiwan leaning more towards the PRC.
In summary, the US is undoubtedly a sovereign and democratic country. The decision of the US president to invite guests to his home should not be influenced by the views of other countries. On Aug. 2, then-US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi defended her controversial decision to visit Taiwan last year. She stated that the PRC’s aggression against Taiwan means that the US cannot afford to be weak and silent. Instead of being defensive on this sensitive issue, perhaps it is time for Washington to think creatively and go against the prevailing sentiment.
Lin Tzu-yao lives in Kaohsiung and holds a master’s degree from National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of National Development, majoring in Chinese studies and cross-strait relations. Cathy Fang is an MA student in the international affairs program at George Washington University, US. She previously served as a legislative assistant in the Legislative Yuan.
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