There is no doubt that US-China relations are tense, as — under Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — the communist government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasing its political, economic and military pressure on democratically governed Taiwan. Somehow the existence of a free and vibrant democracy on its doorstep is a thorn in the thigh of the undemocratic rulers in Beijing.
So there is no doubt that Beijing is the problem. And this problem could easily be resolved if the leaders in Beijing would accept Taiwan as a friendly neighbor, and strive toward peaceful coexistence, but somehow the PRC’s distorted version of history gets in the way.
It bases its claims on the argument that “Taiwan has been part of China since the Ming and Qing dynasties.” That simply was not the case: It was never part of the Ming Dynasty, while the Qing Dynasty was considered a foreign colonial regime by the islanders, which prompted “an uprising every three years and a revolution every five years.”
The regime in Beijing negates the fact that Taiwan has its own history and culture — including a rich indigenous culture — and perceives relations with the island almost exclusively through the dark lens of its civil war against the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), which lasted from 1926 through 1949.
This civil war between the Chinese communists of Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) was fought on the mainland, but Taiwan and its future became unwilling pawns in their civil war when the US allowed Chiang and his Nationalists to occupy Taiwan after the end of World War II.
And there begins the first major misconception that one sees in international media, which all too often write that “after a civil war, Taiwan split off from China in 1949.” Taiwan never “split off” from anything, but was occupied by the losing side in the Chinese Civil War which — as it was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945 — it had no part in it.
During the next three to four decades, the Chinese Nationalists occupying Taiwan continued their claim to rule China. This claim increasingly lost credibility, and in the 1970s most countries — including the US — recognized the government in Beijing as the legitimate government of China.
This was a choice between two governments claiming to represent China. The West recognized only one government, thus the “one China policy” was born. And this leads to the second misconception one often finds in international media: That “one China policy” means that the West recognizes Taiwan as part of China.
This is simply not the case either: When they recognized Beijing as the government of China, virtually all Western countries took the position that Taiwan’s status was undetermined, and — in accordance with the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951-1952 — needed to be determined peacefully, taking the views of the Taiwanese people into account.
Many countries used language such as “take note of,” “acknowledge” or “respect” the position of the PRC government regarding Taiwan’s status, but as any self-respecting diplomat knows, these are terms used in diplomacy to politely say one disagrees with the other’s position.
A third misperception is that too many media wittingly or unwittingly copy the “reunification” language used by the PRC. Since its founding in 1949, the PRC never had any control or sovereignty over Taiwan in the first place, so a “re”-unification is a misnomer at best.
Thus, the international media would bring more balance to their reporting if they included language highlighting Taiwan’s own history, culture and existence separate from China. Certainly, “splitting off from China in 1949” and “reunification” are no-noes that need to be avoided.
Regarding “one China,” it is essential to make the crucial distinction between the PRC’s insistence on its “one China principle” (Taiwan has “always” been part of China — simply false), and the “one China policy” phrasing used by virtually all Western countries, which leaves considerable leeway in their position on Taiwan’s status.
In any case, under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, Taiwan is a nation-state, as it meets the qualifications of defined territory, stable population and a government capable of entering into relations with other states. The convention even states that “the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.”
Circling back to the beginning of this article: Yes, through its aggressive behavior, the PRC is causing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, but it is essential that the international media get some of these basic facts straight.
Gerrit van der Wees is a former Dutch diplomat who served as publisher of Taiwan Communique from 1980 through 2016. He now teaches the history of Taiwan at George Mason University, and US relations with East Asia at the George Washington University Elliott School for International Affairs.
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