The EU and Japan have long been close post-war allies.
However, there are growing signs their relationship is entering a “golden age,” with geopolitical and economic ramifications well beyond the bilateral partnership.
Grand terminology such as “golden” is, of course, subjective, and can be prone to reversal. For instance, the UK and China declared a “golden era” during the administration of then British prime minister David Cameron after 2010, but that has since been hastily jettisoned given the range of bilateral challenges.
Yet, there do appear to be strong reasons the “golden” adage is highly applicable to EU-Japan relations, especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with bilateral ties at what might be an all-time high. While politicians in the two powers have not yet used the specific term extensively, it has been coined by a growing number of key thinkers, including leading diplomats such as Jean de Ruyt, the former Belgian permanent representative to the EU, NATO and the UN.
One of the reasons for the usage of the golden term is the wide range of important agreements between the two powers in the past few years. This includes the Economic Partnership Agreement, the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement, the bilateral Green Alliance, and the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure.
The joint declaration signed during the EU-Japan summit in May last year also underlined the growing bilateral common ground. This is underpinned not just by long standing cooperation, but also strong, shared values and principles such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, good governance, multilateralism and open market economies.
What is particularly striking about the evolution of bilateral relations in the past few years is how what has traditionally been a partnership founded on economic cooperation has evolved into a deeper security relationship. The latter has become particularly pronounced during the war in Ukraine, but is not limited to the European theater only since Russia’s invasion.
There has been a significant growth of interest and understanding within Europe of the Asia-Pacific region. This was showcased when the EU published its new strategy for cooperation in the region, which clearly demonstrated that Brussels views Japan as a key partner in the region, with new economic cooperation in key sectors such as railways to wider security activities such as joint naval exercises.
The growing depth and breadth of bilateral relations was displayed at the pivotal EU-Japan annual summit on Thursday last week. That agenda included steps for implementing the blossoming, bilateral strategic, economic and connectivity partnerships.
Inevitably, it was Ukraine at the top of the agenda, especially in the context of a NATO summit Tuesday and Wednesday last week. Japan, which was invited last year for the first time to the military alliance’s leadership conference — has been steadfast in its support for Ukraine since Russia’s invasion, including clear international leadership during its chairing of the G7 this year. In this time, it has sought to draw a parallel between the security threat Russia poses to Ukraine and wider Europe, and that which China poses in the Asia-Pacific region.
The warming of the EU-Japan defense relationship therefore comes amid growing mutual concern about Moscow and Beijing. Meanwhile, the administration of former US president Donald Trump from 2017 to 2021 showed that the US might not always be the dependable ally it once was.
Take the example of France (the EU’s only nuclear weapons power) and Japan, which are enhancing security ties, with Paris intending to make the Asia-Pacific region a priority axis of its diplomacy. France, which is already active in Japan’s civil nuclear industry, also wants to bolster its presence in that nation’s military industry, as Tokyo recently announced a significant increase in its armed forces budget.
Beyond Ukraine, there is a rich forward agenda of ideas to move the bilateral partnership into ever more positive territory. This includes boosting maritime security cooperation; enhancing infrastructure development; and better aligning the EU’s Global Gateway foreign agenda, the Japan-EU Partnership on sustainable connectivity and quality infrastructure.
Building from the bilateral Green Alliance, there is also significant space for enhancing the partnership in energy security, decarbonization and green supply chains, including critical minerals. This is especially significant given mutual concern about the implications of the US Inflation Reduction Act.
Taken together, what all this illuminates is the increased opportunity for the EU and Japan to make a much bigger global impact, across wide ranging issues, amid a fast-changing global geopolitical and economic landscape. A model for what could be achieved is shown by the leadership both powers have shown on the international trade and rules-based economic order agenda in the past few years.
This bilateral push stepped up several gears under Trump’s administration as the US de-emphasized this agenda amid Washington’s focus on “America first.” At much the same time, the EU-Japan trade agreement — covering about one-third of global GDP and almost 650 million people — showed a different path forward for the world, promoting commitment to multilateralism and trade liberalization. The deal was not only important in itself, but also helped shape the wider diplomacy of trade negotiations at key forums such as Japan’s G20 in 2019 and various G7 leadership meetings of the era.
So the EU-Japan summit provided another showcase for why bilateral ties are at such a historic high. The two powers have become global leaders around issues such as multilateral trade, a rules-based economic order and liberal democracy itself, and this could extend in the coming years to wider agendas such as energy security and green growth.
Andrew Hammond is an associate at the London School of Economics and Political Science’s think tank LSE IDEAS.
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