The first inklings that Chinese Nationalist Party Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) was going to nominate New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜) as the party’s presidential candidate over Hon Hai Precision Industry Co founder Terry Gou (郭台銘) came when KMT Taipei City Councilor Chin Huei-chu (秦慧珠) early yesterday morning wrote on Facebook: “Congratulations Hou You-yi, many thanks to Terry Gou, bless the KMT! Go, go, go.”
Gou’s supporters flooded Chu’s Facebook page with frantic pleas of support for Gou’s candidacy, saying that they could never support Hou for president if Gou were left out in the cold.
Former KMT legislator Chiu Yi (邱毅) had predicted that Gou would respond in one of three ways: two that would be good for party unity, and one damaging to it. The latter would be Gou reacting in anger to a perceived slight from Chu, avoiding the KMT Central Standing Committee meeting in the afternoon and considering standing as an independent or teaming up with Taiwan People’s Party Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) on a joint ticket.
This could have led to a repeat of the 2000 election, when Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won after a disgruntled James Soong (宋楚瑜) split the pan-blue vote and blocked former KMT chairman Lien Chan’s (連戰) path to power.
As it happened, Gou reacted to the official confirmation of Hou’s nomination with a promise to offer his support and work to facilitate victory for Hou.
He is right to do so. This makes it easier for Chu and the KMT to secure the unity they make so much of at every major election, simply by virtue of the difficulty in achieving it.
It would certainly be interesting to see how the party old guard get behind Hou, as he has never been regarded as one of the party elite, and was born and bred in Taiwan: The KMT has traditionally kept “local” figures with no links to China very much at arm’s length.
Hou was the right choice. With his business bravado and lack of political experience, Gou was too much of a political wild card. The president of Taiwan needs to be very skillful on the domestic and international stages.
Hou has proven to be of sufficient mettle domestically; he is very much untested internationally.
Responding to news of Hou’s official nomination, Ko told former New Power Party legislator Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌) during a radio broadcast that Hou’s biggest problem is that nobody has any idea what his stance is on cross-strait relations.
At least on this front, Hou has an advantage over the DPP’s candidate, Vice President William Lai (賴清德). If he is elected president, Beijing is likelier to talk to him, assuming he continues the KMT’s longstanding recognition of the so-called “1992 consensus.” Conversely, China is unlikely to show any interest sitting at the negotiating table with Lai.
Herein lies the problem with Hou’s reticence at confirming his stance thus far: He might be committed to protecting the Republic of China and the territorial integrity of Taiwan proper, Kinmen, Matsu and the Penghu islands, but that position is essentially Taiwan independence by another name — and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) cannot be expected to buy a minute of that.
The die is now cast, and it is up to Taiwanese and the media to scrutinize Hou’s plans and preparations for taking on the Chinese Communist Party.
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