US President Joe Biden on Monday last week met with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr at the White House as part of his administration’s efforts to bolster the US’ security and economic relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Philippines has garnered attention because of its strategic importance amid escalating tensions between China and its neighboring countries. With its proximity to Taiwan and critical location connecting the South China Sea and the Pacific, the Philippines is a crucial ally and, during a conflict, would be a resupply point and could control chokepoints.
The lasting alliance between the Philippines and the US has been cemented by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, which obligates each nation to aid the other in the event of an attack by a third party.
In light of China’s military activities around Taiwan, which have unnerved senior Philippine officials, Manila has granted the US military new access to four Philippine military bases. Three of the bases are on the main island of Luzon, close to Taiwan, while the fourth is in Palawan province, which lies in the South China Sea. The move underscores the strategic importance of the Philippines in the region’s security landscape.
China has long recognized the Philippines’ strategic value owing to its favorable geographic location. The country’s proximity to the Luzon Strait and the Bashi Channel has been identified as particularly critical, as these passages provide access to the Pacific and the South China Sea. China’s bid to assert control over Fuga Island serves as testament to this fact.
In 2019, the Chinese Fong Zhi Enterprise Corp tried to establish a “smart city” on the island.
However, due to Fuga Island’s location, which is not only less than 400km from Taiwan, but also of significant importance to the Philippines’ own defense, Philippine officials were alarmed. Their concern was that it would allow China to establish an observation post within Philippine borders. Consequently, a Philippine naval base was established on the island.
Some Philippine military officials have said their country would be an ideal corridor for the US to supply Taiwan with munitions in the event of a conflict.
“We are a US ally, we are in a strategic location. We are so close that if anything happens in Taiwan, we will be involved,” said General Emmanuel Bautista, former chief of staff of the armed forces of the Philippines, in an interview with the Financial Times.
Marcos has also signaled in an interview with the Nikkei the need to cooperate with Washington in a possible strategic exigency in the Taiwan Strait, saying that instability in the region would adversely affect the Philippines.
The Philippines holds a critical role in any potential conflict between Taiwan and China, as it is in proximity to southern shipping lanes in the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait facing China.
This geographical positioning makes the Philippines a key focus for all involved parties, whether there is a full Chinese invasion of Taiwan or just a naval blockade.
The significance of the Philippines’ military projection in a Taiwan Strait war cannot be overstated, as it offers the US military a range of bases closer to the assumed theater of war.
Despite a lack of official discussions at this stage, Taiwan, as a key stakeholder in a potential conflict, must recognize the strategic importance of the Philippines.
Lien Yi-ting is a graduate student at the Harvard Kennedy School. She was a spokesperson for President Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election campaign and has worked at the Presidential Office and the National Security Council.
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