A year ago, following US President Joe Biden’s election, multilateralism once again became the beating heart of global climate action. G20 leaders agreed to more ambitious near-term climate targets en route to achieving net zero emissions by mid-century, and they committed to ending inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies and cooperating on clean energy deployment to phase out coal more quickly. The willingness of China and India to address fossil fuels reflected a growing awareness of the macroeconomic risks of resisting the clean-energy transition.
These outcomes were crucial for delivering a litany of new initiatives at last year’s COP26 in Glasgow that were dedicated to “keeping 1.5 alive,” in line with the Paris climate agreement’s goal for limiting the increase in global temperature to 1.5°C, relative to the preindustrial average. They also helped set the stage for the historic Glasgow Climate Pact, which commits every country to phase down unabated coal use, even if India and China were able to block calls to phase out coal entirely.
Unfortunately, the stage for this week’s G20 summit in Bali could not be more different. Geopolitical and economic conditions are much less favorable, owing largely to Russia’s appalling war of aggression in Ukraine, with G7 countries backtracking on their commitments to end fossil-fuel investment as a result.
Today’s heightened US-China tensions would, hopefully, be eased somewhat by the bilateral meeting between Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in Bali.
However, forging a strong outcome would be hard.
Given that G20 countries account for about 80 percent of global greenhouse-gas emissions, the summit would set the tone for the final outcome of this year’s COP27, which is to conclude in Egypt after the G20 wraps up in Indonesia. The proceedings in Sharm el-Sheikh have already been dominated by the world’s most vulnerable countries calling for climate justice and demanding that big emitters pay up to support their transitions and livelihoods.
This is why the fight against climate change might be the unifying moment the G20 requires — and the G20’s Asian members have a vital role to play in that.
Rather than backtracking on climate action during the ongoing and compounding crises of the past year, Asian economies have deepened their resolve. Major Asian emitters headline the small list of countries that actually responded to the Glasgow Climate Pact’s call to increase their climate ambitions this year: India, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam and the new government in Australia have all enhanced their targets. While greater ambition is needed for commitments to align with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C target, regional momentum is moving in the right direction.
Asia is acting because it makes good policy sense. Research commissioned by the Asia Society’s High-Level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero shows that more ambitious climate action is a boon for the region’s economic development. If the region fully implements the climate targets it set at COP26, it would boost GDP growth by as much as 5.4 percent by 2030, while also creating more new jobs, reducing energy costs and strengthening energy security. This is a big deal for governments looking to escape the inflation trap and rising energy prices.
Developing economies are also aware that embracing the green transformation can help mobilize the massive amounts of investment needed to turn rhetoric into reality. For example, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are among those publishing climate prosperity plans that, if funded, could enhance resilience, reduce poverty and spearhead economic growth.
Likewise, Indonesia and Vietnam are expected to announce new “just energy transition partnerships,” replicating a model whereby developed countries committed US$8.5 billion to South Africa last year to enable a faster exit from coal while protecting fossil-fuel workers’ livelihoods.
Political will and policy certainty are powerful tools for unleashing capital flows from rich donor countries, limiting the risk for private financing and unlocking new domestic resources.
Asia finds itself in the multilateral hot seat at a critical time. India is to take on the G20 presidency from Indonesia following this week’s summit, Japan is to host next year’s G7 summit and the United Arab Emirates is to host COP28 next year. Simply put, climate action can be the common thread that helps rebuild a consensus in favor of multilateralism.
The G20 could start by seeking a unified commitment among member countries to climate action as a driver of economic recovery and growth. After India, the G20 presidency would rotate to Brazil, implying a unique opportunity to define what this looks like from the perspective of major emerging economies. Countries such as Indonesia, India and Brazil could emphasize the win-win benefits of deepening cooperation.
Another way the G20 could lead is by elevating the “Bridgetown Agenda” championed by Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Mottley to provide emergency liquidity, expand multilateral lending and mobilize the private sector, in part by seeking a new issuance of US$650 billion in special drawing rights (the IMF’s reserve asset). Advancing the Bridgetown Agenda would require political will from the world’s most powerful lenders and shareholders.
Under India’s leadership next year, the G20 should seek to achieve tangible outcomes. This could include devising a blueprint for modern, resilient energy systems; outlining a supportive policy infrastructure for critical climate technologies, such as green hydrogen and battery storage; and getting climate finance to work for all developing countries. India could also use the G7 bloc of developing economies as a bellwether to ensure that the G20 is meeting the needs of the world’s most vulnerable countries.
Multilateralism is on life support at a moment when it is critical for humanity’s survival. By putting climate action at the heart of their efforts to rebuild consensus and reinvigorate multilateralism, Asian countries would prop open the world’s window of opportunity to prevent climate disaster. They would also catalyze their own ability to benefit from the massive economic and social opportunities created by the green transition.
Kevin Rudd, a former prime minister of Australia and founder of the G20 Leaders’ Summit, is president of the Asia Society and convener of the High-Level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero. Ban Ki-moon, a former secretary-general of the UN, is deputy chair of The Elders and a member of the High-Level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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