Double Ten National Day on Monday last week marked an apt turnaround of strategic pushback against China’s sustained pressure. Beijing has proposed the Hong Kong model of “one country, two systems” for Taiwan to give the appearance of offering a reasonable solution to domestic and external audiences, and to serve as a trap for pro-Taiwanese independence groups and the West, in which too forceful a rejection of the proposal could backfire.
The US’ approach must constantly be a step ahead in this game increasingly dictated by Beijing. Its policy of “strategic ambiguity” is practically dead, given the absence of trust, and as its deterrence effect has steadily eroded amid increasing Chinese desperation and the inevitability of the West’s pushback.
Washington’s new approach of strategic clarity must be to ensure that the scope of deterrence and its intensity is clear, consistent and overwhelming, while providing Beijing with an off-ramp to new incentives for either working toward peaceful unification or preserving the “status quo” with an end to coercion.
However, what is China willing to sacrifice for Taiwan, at the potential expense of derailing its 2049 “Chinese Dream” goal. Beijing realizes that the world will not necessarily be crippled without its economic leadership, and that the West can regroup and pool resources to enforce and deter it. The West can also count on other players fearful of Beijing’s aggressiveness, further reinforcing the containment strategy’s effectiveness.
Taipei, for its part, needs to deepen its narrative globally, capitalizing on its niche strength as both a quid pro quo and deterrence platform, especially in terms of its semiconductor and chips dominance. By making the world more dependent on its critical chips and technological advantages, the costs and effects of any backfire would be raised.
Taipei needs full regional support if it is to survive: It cannot afford to be distracted by other lingering issues with other neighbors, including Japan, which Beijing is happy to exploit.
Taiwan must realize that most countries have no choice but to either support China or be neutral in the unification dilemma, and it needs to wisely tout its chips and keep them close to hold its advantage, while highlighting the moral cause and showing that it is the victim.
It needs to be wise in formulating such a compelling case that if Taiwan falls by force, China will be more emboldened in its regional and global ambition, that this truly is the last stand for democracy and freedom where nations and people can resonate.
The question remains whether the rest of the world is ready to supersede short-term interests and reliance on China to accept the new pushback against Beijing.
In the final analysis, China remains its own worst enemy, and the ball is in its court in determining the outcome of cross-strait relations and regional peace.
Collins Chong Yew Keat provides analysis and opinion to international media on contemporary global and regional issues with a focus on strategic and security studies, US foreign policy and regional conflict.
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