The 14th Straits Forum was held in Xiamen in China’s Fujian Province on July 13. To pander to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), former KMT chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) said she believed the COVID-19 pandemic and the Taiwanese independence movement would eventually die out, and rural cultural tourism and the economies on both sides of the Taiwan Strait would then become more prosperous.
Hung’s remark, again, shows her inclination to be the CCP’s mouthpiece for promoting unification.
When Hung visited Xinjiang in May, she praised the CCP’s policy, saying: “Xinjiang is a harmonious, joyful, diverse and inclusive society,” and accused the US — a fellow cotton-producing nation — of using every means to slander Xinjiang’s cotton industry.
This is yet again one of those occasions when certain KMT cohorts — led by Hung — were demonstrating a strong pro-China, anti-US attitude.
Other KMT party members would not have wanted to walk in lockstep with China, because they are aware that pro-China ideology goes against mainstream values in Taiwan. However, as Hung is already marginalized in the KMT, she has to dance to the CCP’s tune to maintain her political influence.
Even though the KMT is always complaining about being labeled as pro-China by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), party members such as Hung prove that the DPP is at least partly right. The DPP is merely laying bare and pointing out the truth that certain members of the KMT have close associations with the CCP.
There is a quote from the Records of the Three Kingdoms (三國志): “The best way to stop slander is to enhance self-cultivation.”
If the KMT wishes to change its image, then it should start by improving itself. The first step would be to distance itself from pro-unification figures in the party and expel those flagrant pro-China devotees such as Hung, especially before the local elections in November.
The KMT is now at a disadvantage: If it wishes to hold on to the support of pro-unification voters, it would lose the support of independent voters, but if it tries to win the support of the swing vote, it might not necessarily lose pro-unification supporters. The KMT would do well to take note of this. Expelling Hung would help the party transform its image and possibly win votes from independents.
If Hung is expelled from the KMT, then the Taiwan Affairs Office would lose crucial pro-unification advocates. If the unification agenda is left to the New Party or Chinese Unification Promotion Party, then its promotion and facilitation would be much more constrained. Furthermore, if Hung is expelled, she would lose her status to push for unification without the invaluable title of “former KMT chairwoman.”
Whether the CCP can accomplish its unification agenda lies with the KMT. The KMT should also dispel the false impression that tensions would rise across the Taiwan Strait if they defy China’s “united front” tactics. Drawing the line with China would not affect cross-strait security, and neither would the expulsion of Hung.
Lin Rongjie holds a doctorate in history.
Translated by Rita Wang
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