Now that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine is more than 100 days old and “Ukraine fatigue” is setting in for most people, I am finally able to think more or less rationally about a calamity that has turned my world, and that of many like-minded Russians, upside down — although in a much less traumatic way, of course, than it has done for Ukrainians.
Trying to analyze how the unjust war my country started is difficult. There is a thin line between being analytical and being desensitized to the horror Russia has wreaked.
Still, I have lost much sleep following events in minute detail, and I would like to share the lessons I have drawn so far — with a necessary caveat. Being Russian, and having initially underestimated the madness that drove Putin to invade, I cannot make authoritative judgements.
Illustration: Mountain People
LISTEN TO NATIONALISTS
The fog of war that obscured what was happening on the battlefield during the first weeks of the invasion has thinned somewhat. Military analysts initially relied on data from the Ukraine General Staff and Western intelligence services, in part because they could not find trustworthy Russian sources.
However, since the first days, Russian nationalists — on the ground and on the sidelines — have emerged as a surprisingly useful information source that makes parsing official Russian propaganda largely unnecessary.
I get an eerie feeling when the Institute for the Study of War, the think tank that provides some of the most detailed analysis of the battlefield situation, quotes someone nicknamed Boitsovy Kot Murz (literally, “Purr the Fighting Cat”) on the situation inside the Russian and pro-Russian separatist militaries.
On the other hand, Murz — nationalist blogger Andrei Morozov — knows what he is talking about and voices his criticism at significant personal risk.
Igor Girkin, known by his nom de guerre Strelkov, also provides credible analysis of the Russian and pro-Russian troops’ troubles with poor command and logistics, as well as Moscow’s strategic failures.
One of the key participants in the pro-Russian rebellion in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Girkin openly dreams of a role in the war, but the Kremlin regards him as not loyal enough to have earned one. In part because of Girkin’s jealousy and frustration, his Telegram channel has been a must-read during this war.
Nationalists such as Morozov and Girkin root for a Russian victory with all their empire-loving hearts, but their deep hatred of the adversary is interlaced with an equally deep respect for Ukrainians’ fighting ability. The nationalists openly mistrust, often despise, Putin’s top brass. They never believed in the blitzkrieg that Putin apparently thought he was about to carry out.
They also have access to sources in various branches of the invading army, from the separatist militias to the Wagner private military company to regular units. Weighed against information coming from Ukrainian and Western sources, their insight and analysis provide much-needed balance, a job at which the Putin propaganda machine fails miserably.
The nationalists’ voices are also important because, in the event of a Russian defeat, they probably would be heard loudly. They might even end up as the country’s next revanchist driving force. Their sincerity could buy them popular support if the regime weakens and is unable to keep Russians in check by repression alone.
Given that the remains of Russia’s liberal opposition largely have left the country since the war began, giving up any realistic claim on a major role in the post-Putin future, the likes of Girkin and his comrades inside and outside the invading army are the most credible non-regime force left.
They are also in many ways more dangerous to Russia itself and its neighbors than Putin and his team of crooks and sycophants.
COMPROMISE UNLIKELY
In the first days of the war, most serious analysts believed a Ukrainian defeat was imminent. In later weeks, haphazard, overoptimistic, poorly planned Russian moves caused the Russian military to be seen as something of a paper tiger, but by the 100-day point, both sides have proved worthy of each other militarily.
The Russians showed they were able to learn from their mistakes. They moderated their unrealistic goals, centralized their operation’s command, focused resources in areas where they felt success was most likely, and improved logistics and coordination among branches.
The Ukrainians have quickly converted their ferocious motivation to knowledge of the adversary, which has enabled some successful counterattacks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, always a great communicator, has blossomed into a figure as heroic as he is skillful at messaging. The Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure has done the impossible and kept transport running, the roads cleared, the blown-up bridges replaced and the military supplied.
The first 100 days of the conflict have shown that the war could go either way. Neither side is about to collapse or give up, and any concessions recorded in an eventual peace deal would be hard-fought for.
Besides, the atrocities Russians have committed in Ukraine, from Bucha to Mariupol to Odesa, make it politically impossible for Ukrainian leadership to offer any kind of compromise.
On the other hand, Putin’s Russia is probably unwilling to keep its end of any bargain. After the failure of the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, it no longer believes in deals. A negotiated outcome is possible only if one side is thoroughly beaten, and it would resemble that side’s capitulation more than a compromise.
The war that did not end in three days, three weeks or three months promises to stretch out for as long as it might take for a decisive victory for the invaders or the defenders. That could be a very long time, and even then, the matter might not be settled, because the loser would be hell-bent on revenge.
VIEW WEST SOBERLY
There is a wide gap between Western perceptions of unprecedented unity in support of Ukraine and Ukrainians’ sober view of how much the West has been able to help.
Before the conflict began, the flow of Western weapons — mostly small arms along with portable and nonlethal equipment — was sufficient for Putin to see a casus belli, to the extent he needed one, but far from enough to stop his invading force. Ukrainians have had to prove their mettle and keep proving it to receive heavier weapons.
However, they are receiving them more slowly than military necessity dictates, and the need to get trained in using the weapons systems slows the process further.
NATO has steered clear of anything that could be construed as direct intervention. Before the war, as the threat of a Russian invasion increased, it did not move to admit Ukraine — although in retrospect, granting Ukraine membership might have been one of the few pre-emptive moves capable of stopping Putin in his tracks. Now that Finland and Sweden are joining, Putin’s response is surprisingly toothless.
Since the invasion began, NATO has rejected Ukraine’s calls for a no-fly zone, showing Ukrainians as they fought off the full might of Russia’s conventional military that it was intimidated by Putin’s ritual threats of nuclear war.
When it comes to actual fighting, Ukraine still stands alone in the blood and the mud, and this should long be remembered in victory or defeat. The role of foot soldiers in the West’s proxy war with Russia is not one Ukrainians would willingly have chosen, and once peace is re-established, they would certainly bear grudges — bigger ones against their less activist Western supporters such as Germany, France and neighboring Hungary, and smaller ones against the US, which has the decisive word on the extent of Western support.
All the loopholes in the seemingly severe Western sanctions regime cannot be easily forgotten. Sure, the sanctions hurt, but not enough in the short and medium term that Putin would lose decisively or reconsider his options.
A Ukrainian defeat would surely lead to mutual recriminations and deeper rifts between the US and Europe, between Europe’s west and its east — and even within eastern Europe between the Baltics, Poland and the Czech Republic, which have gone above and beyond the call of duty in supporting Ukraine, and a far less enthusiastic Hungary.
A Russian defeat would help mask the differences, but probably lead to wrangling about sharing the financial burden of rebuilding Ukraine, and squabbling over who did how much during the conflict.
HELP UKRAINE REBUILD
The war has lasted well beyond the typical modern attention span. It is hard to resist distractions that are, in large part, consequences of the war, too — the inflation caused by rising energy and food prices, the likely recession in Western economies, the stock market sell-off.
By the time the war is over, few people outside Ukraine might be interested in its fate — in how much territory it might have to give up to Russia; in the enormous job of rebuilding bombed-out cities, industries and infrastructure; and in the fate of the almost 14 million Ukrainians who have been forced to leave their homes.
Despite its European geography, Ukraine risks shifting to the periphery of Western minds, as Syria has.
That would be the biggest mistake the rest of the world could make, not only because Putin and the nationalists who might come to rule Russia after him are surely to keep obsessing about Ukraine. If support wanes, if Ukraine is pushed to make a humiliating deal, if the post-war restoration effort is anything short of the kind of investment the US made in Europe after World War II, then more invasions such as Putin’s are likely to occur in every part of the world where a strongman nurtures territorial ambitions.
The weaker sides in such conflicts would be strongly motivated to give up rather than fight as Ukraine has, if only to avoid destruction on a similar scale. If Ukraine is not rewarded and compensated for its sacrifice, others in its position could be left discouraged, fearful and uncertain.
Ukraine has fought alone, but helping it get back on its feet and prosper even if Russia grabs more territory is the world’s business. The country cannot rise again on its own. It might seem too early for the world to plan to help after the war, but planning might keep the world from forgetting the price Ukraine is paying for its iron will to survive.
Leonid Bershidsky is a former Bloomberg Opinion Europe columnist and a member of the Bloomberg News Automation Team. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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