Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space.
After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break.
Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s ability to participate in international organizations.
Resolution 2758 was intended to determine that “the People’s Republic of China, rather than the Chiang Kai-shek [蔣介石] regime, represents ‘China’ in the United Nations.”
However, the text of the resolution does not address “whether Taiwan is part of China” or “who governs the Taiwanese people.”
Nevertheless, China has weaponized Resolution 2758 through both legal and cognitive warfare to suppress Taiwan.
Legally, China continuously misleads the international community by asserting that Resolution 2758 determined Taiwan’s sovereignty — which it did not. This lends legitimacy to the Chinese Communist Party’s diplomatic pressures on Taiwan.
Cognitively, China conflates its “one China principle” with Resolution 2758, creating a false impression that the Taiwan issue has been resolved, diverting attention away from the fact that the resolution does not address Taiwan’s status.
The US recognizes China’s weaponization of Resolution 2758. As a result, Washington has been mobilizing the international community to reassess and reinterpret Resolution 2758, aiming to decouple Taiwan’s sovereign status from the resolution.
On the 50th anniversary of Resolution 2758 in 2021, then-US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Rick Waters publicly accused China of misusing the resolution to prevent Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international affairs.
Last year, the US House of Representatives passed the Taiwan International Solidarity Act, which says that Resolution 2758 does not pertain to Taiwan.
In March last year, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink and US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner told a congressional hearing that China had been using economic incentives and misinterpretations of Resolution 2758 to usurp Taiwan’s diplomatic allies.
Under the agenda set by the US, Taiwan should proactively devise strategies and ensure high-quality support from like-minded and allied countries during the World Health Assembly (WHA) to counteract China’s misleading narratives to the international community.
For example, during the 2022 WHA, the US supported Eswatini’s speech that rejected China’s long-standing misuse and hijacking of Resolution 2758, which said:
First, Resolution 2758 and WHA Resolution 25.1 only address the representation of China and do not authorize China to represent Taiwan, nor do they acknowledge Taiwan as part of China.
Second, the 2005 memorandum of understanding between China and the WHO grants Beijing an unreasonable veto power, allowing it to unilaterally decide Taiwan’s participation in the WHA or other WHO affairs.
Third, Taiwan’s participation in the WHA does not imply the WHO’s position on Taiwan’s sovereignty. Therefore, the WHO must invite Taiwan to the WHA to fulfill its vision of “health for all.”
Such arguments should be consistently and firmly promoted internationally to counteract China and its allies’ manipulation and misinterpretation of Resolution 2758.
Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHO signifies a failure by the international community to uphold its commitment to humanitarian principles and the promotion of health rights for all people, rather than a lack of capability of Taiwan to participate in global health affairs.
Taiwan should loudly voice its demands, leveraging the international support for Taiwan during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In the short term, Taiwan should continue to mobilize supportive countries to clarify that Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty, and advocate for inclusion in critical WHO frameworks like the WHO pandemic agreement.
In the medium term, Taiwan should aim for the passage of resolutions at the WHA mandating the regular invitation of Taiwan to assemblies.
In the long term, Taiwan should work toward becoming a formal WHO member under its own name, thereby permanently resolving the issue of its participation.
Lin Shih-chia is executive director of the Foundation of Medical Professionals Alliance in Taiwan.
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
For Taiwan, the ongoing US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets are a warning signal: When a major power stretches the boundaries of self-defense, smaller states feel the tremors first. Taiwan’s security rests on two pillars: US deterrence and the credibility of international law. The first deters coercion from China. The second legitimizes Taiwan’s place in the international community. One is material. The other is moral. Both are indispensable. Under the UN Charter, force is lawful only in response to an armed attack or with UN Security Council authorization. Even pre-emptive self-defense — long debated — requires a demonstrably imminent
RSS