There is no such thing as a “silicon shield.”
This trope has gained traction in the world of Taiwanese news, likely with the best intentions. Anything that breaks the China-controlled narrative that Taiwan is doomed to be conquered is welcome, but after observing its rise in recent months, I now believe that the “silicon shield” is a myth — one that is ultimately working against Taiwan.
The basic silicon shield idea is that the world, particularly the US, would rush to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion because they do not want Beijing to seize the nation’s vital and unique chip industry.
However, Taiwan has been a semiconductor powerhouse for two decades at most, and the US has been keen on preventing the Chinese Communist Party from taking Taiwan since 1945. That was the whole point of bringing the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to Taiwan in the first place.
The bottom line is that US military support would be forthcoming as long as Taiwan remains strategically located, whether it is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) or simply a humble former Japanese colony. Even with the GDP of Guam, Taiwan would still hold immense strategic importance to the US.
Nor is democracy the reason they would rush to Taiwan’s aid. Taiwan used to be a dictatorship, and the US was still on its side. Now that the nation has achieved democracy, Taiwanese must keep waving their own flag in front of the world, not the flag of TSMC.
This is primarily a battle of narratives on a global scale, and in terms of signaling, repeating the silicon shield idea is counterproductive. This myth paints everyone in an unflattering light: Taiwan’s partners as cynical enough to care more about chips than 23 million people, and Taiwanese as essentially holding the world hostage, coercing everyone to come fight for them or lose their electronic comforts. That is disastrous for Taiwan’s global image, and it is not even true.
Realpolitik is real. The US simply shares a common interest in keeping Beijing’s hands off Taiwan. This is not an anti-US position, but a simple acknowledgment that every country puts its interests first, regardless of who leads it.
However, that does not mean Taiwan should portray itself as a technology blackmailer. It is possible to argue that these overlapping strategic interests now align with the freedom of Taiwanese, regardless of what is produced. Taiwan’s geostrategic partners are all democracies, and it is vital to engage with their populations — or rather, their voters. The goal should be to avoid people thinking Taiwan is playing the tech card to force them onto its side, but rather for them to care about Taiwan.
Even if Taiwan does have some economic leverage over certain governments (and most countries have an asset of that kind), that should be handled by technocrats, not turned into public messaging.
Even from a pragmatic standpoint, what would happen if Taiwan’s technology became obsolete? Would Taiwan always be the leader in chips? Even if factories do not move, who is to say another, more vital technology would not emerge and render Taiwan irrelevant? Do people really want something as volatile as technological leadership to be their lifeline?
Finally, faith in a silicon shield blinds us to the darker side of Taiwan’s chip industry: rising inequality. For young people struggling to pay rent or find decent jobs, the growing rift between the haves (those in high-tech industries) and the have-nots (most of the population) is a major source of resentment and a growing vulnerability to dangerous populism. The biggest threat lies within, and the enemy feeds on these social divides.
Becoming a silicon oligopoly is not a blessing, either; it is a danger to Taiwan’s democracy and freedom. Not only does it send the wrong signal to the world, it threatens to turn the country into the kind of unequal society that no longer feels worth defending.
Julien Oeuillet is a journalist in Taiwan. He is the founding editor of Indo-Pacific Open News. He also writes and produces radio and television programs for several English-language publications globally.
In the first year of his second term, US President Donald Trump continued to shake the foundations of the liberal international order to realize his “America first” policy. However, amid an atmosphere of uncertainty and unpredictability, the Trump administration brought some clarity to its policy toward Taiwan. As expected, bilateral trade emerged as a major priority for the new Trump administration. To secure a favorable trade deal with Taiwan, it adopted a two-pronged strategy: First, Trump accused Taiwan of “stealing” chip business from the US, indicating that if Taipei did not address Washington’s concerns in this strategic sector, it could revisit its Taiwan
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) challenges and ignores the international rules-based order by violating Taiwanese airspace using a high-flying drone: This incident is a multi-layered challenge, including a lawfare challenge against the First Island Chain, the US, and the world. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defines lawfare as “controlling the enemy through the law or using the law to constrain the enemy.” Chen Yu-cheng (陳育正), an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies, at Taiwan’s Fu Hsing Kang College (National Defense University), argues the PLA uses lawfare to create a precedent and a new de facto legal
Chile has elected a new government that has the opportunity to take a fresh look at some key aspects of foreign economic policy, mainly a greater focus on Asia, including Taiwan. Still, in the great scheme of things, Chile is a small nation in Latin America, compared with giants such as Brazil and Mexico, or other major markets such as Colombia and Argentina. So why should Taiwan pay much attention to the new administration? Because the victory of Chilean president-elect Jose Antonio Kast, a right-of-center politician, can be seen as confirming that the continent is undergoing one of its periodic political shifts,
Taiwan’s long-term care system has fallen into a structural paradox. Staffing shortages have led to a situation in which almost 20 percent of the about 110,000 beds in the care system are vacant, but new patient admissions remain closed. Although the government’s “Long-term Care 3.0” program has increased subsidies and sought to integrate medical and elderly care systems, strict staff-to-patient ratios, a narrow labor pipeline and rising inflation-driven costs have left many small to medium-sized care centers struggling. With nearly 20,000 beds forced to remain empty as a consequence, the issue is not isolated management failures, but a far more
RSS