There is no such thing as a “silicon shield.”
This trope has gained traction in the world of Taiwanese news, likely with the best intentions. Anything that breaks the China-controlled narrative that Taiwan is doomed to be conquered is welcome, but after observing its rise in recent months, I now believe that the “silicon shield” is a myth — one that is ultimately working against Taiwan.
The basic silicon shield idea is that the world, particularly the US, would rush to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion because they do not want Beijing to seize the nation’s vital and unique chip industry.
However, Taiwan has been a semiconductor powerhouse for two decades at most, and the US has been keen on preventing the Chinese Communist Party from taking Taiwan since 1945. That was the whole point of bringing the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to Taiwan in the first place.
The bottom line is that US military support would be forthcoming as long as Taiwan remains strategically located, whether it is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) or simply a humble former Japanese colony. Even with the GDP of Guam, Taiwan would still hold immense strategic importance to the US.
Nor is democracy the reason they would rush to Taiwan’s aid. Taiwan used to be a dictatorship, and the US was still on its side. Now that the nation has achieved democracy, Taiwanese must keep waving their own flag in front of the world, not the flag of TSMC.
This is primarily a battle of narratives on a global scale, and in terms of signaling, repeating the silicon shield idea is counterproductive. This myth paints everyone in an unflattering light: Taiwan’s partners as cynical enough to care more about chips than 23 million people, and Taiwanese as essentially holding the world hostage, coercing everyone to come fight for them or lose their electronic comforts. That is disastrous for Taiwan’s global image, and it is not even true.
Realpolitik is real. The US simply shares a common interest in keeping Beijing’s hands off Taiwan. This is not an anti-US position, but a simple acknowledgment that every country puts its interests first, regardless of who leads it.
However, that does not mean Taiwan should portray itself as a technology blackmailer. It is possible to argue that these overlapping strategic interests now align with the freedom of Taiwanese, regardless of what is produced. Taiwan’s geostrategic partners are all democracies, and it is vital to engage with their populations — or rather, their voters. The goal should be to avoid people thinking Taiwan is playing the tech card to force them onto its side, but rather for them to care about Taiwan.
Even if Taiwan does have some economic leverage over certain governments (and most countries have an asset of that kind), that should be handled by technocrats, not turned into public messaging.
Even from a pragmatic standpoint, what would happen if Taiwan’s technology became obsolete? Would Taiwan always be the leader in chips? Even if factories do not move, who is to say another, more vital technology would not emerge and render Taiwan irrelevant? Do people really want something as volatile as technological leadership to be their lifeline?
Finally, faith in a silicon shield blinds us to the darker side of Taiwan’s chip industry: rising inequality. For young people struggling to pay rent or find decent jobs, the growing rift between the haves (those in high-tech industries) and the have-nots (most of the population) is a major source of resentment and a growing vulnerability to dangerous populism. The biggest threat lies within, and the enemy feeds on these social divides.
Becoming a silicon oligopoly is not a blessing, either; it is a danger to Taiwan’s democracy and freedom. Not only does it send the wrong signal to the world, it threatens to turn the country into the kind of unequal society that no longer feels worth defending.
Julien Oeuillet is a journalist in Taiwan. He is the founding editor of Indo-Pacific Open News. He also writes and produces radio and television programs for several English-language publications globally.
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