In an article published by the Harvard Kennedy School, renowned historian of modern China Rana Mitter used a structured question-and-answer format to deepen the understanding of the relationship between Taiwan and China.
Mitter highlights the differences between the repressive and authoritarian People’s Republic of China and the vibrant democracy that exists in Taiwan, saying that Taiwan and China “have had an interconnected relationship that has been both close and contentious at times.”
However, his description of the history — before and after 1945 — contains significant flaws.
First, he writes that “Taiwan was always broadly regarded by the imperial dynasties of China, including the Qing Dynasty, the last dynasty, as being part of their imperial territories.”
This is simply not the case: Before 1624, when the Dutch established a trading post in what is present-day Tainan, there was no evidence of any Chinese officialdom in Taiwan, let alone any administrative control. It was a wild and hostile territory, inhabited by indigenous groups such as the Siraya.
For example, in 1623, emissaries of Tianqi (天啟帝), the last Ming Dynasty emperor, told the Dutch, who were attempting to seize Macau from the Portuguese as a base for trade with China, to move “beyond our territory.” They raised no objections when the Dutch sailed instead to Formosa, where they built Fort Zeelandia and established administrative control under the Dutch East India Company until 1662.
Another important datapoint overlooked by Mitter is that in 1683, the new Manchu emperor of the Qing Dynasty, Shunzhi (順治皇帝), initially showed little interest in Taiwan, focusing instead on defeating the last remnants of the Ming Dynasty. Emperor Kangxi (康熙帝), Shunzhi’s son and successor, even said that “Taiwan is outside our empire and of no great consequence.” He offered to let the Dutch buy it back.
Mitter rightly wrote that from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan was a Japanese colony, just like India was a British colony. However, by the same token, Taiwan must also be considered a Qing colony from 1683 to 1887, as the Qing regime came from far away and occupied Taiwan, similar to how the British occupied India and the Dutch Indonesia.
In this context, it is essential to mention that during the 200 years of Manchu rule in Taiwan, more than 100 armed revolts erupted, giving rise to the saying Taiwan experienced “an uprising every three years and a rebellion every five.”
The inhabitants of Taiwan viewed the Qing Dynasty as a foreign colonial regime and in no way saw themselves as “part of China.” It was not until 1887 that Taiwan was formally elevated to the status of a province of China, but that only lasted eight years — an inconvenient truth for Beijing today.
Another shortcoming in Mitter’s analysis is that, while he mentions the 1895 transfer of Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the First Sino-Japanese War, he omits the brief, but significant episode of the Republic of Formosa. Established in 1895, it was one of the first republics in Asia and strikingly progressive experiment for the age: Officials were described as being “elected by the people of Taiwan,” a parliament was formed from the local gentry, and the republic adopted its own flag, issued stamps and created a Cabinet.
The new republic’s foreign minister was Chen Chi-tung (陳季同), a seasoned Qing diplomat who spoke fluent French. Drawing on his experience in France, Chen also crafted much of the republic’s symbolism.
However, the republic’s defenses under the “Black Flag” general Liu Yung-fu (劉永福) proved no match for Japan’s modernized army. Over the next five months, Japanese forces steadily advanced, eventually driving the republic’s troops back to their southern capital in Tainan, where they surrendered in October 1895.
In discussing the post-World War II period, Mitter also goes astray. He writes that “[former president] Chiang Kai-shek [蔣介石] ... was finally able to reclaim Taiwan. However, even at that time when there was unification briefly under Chiang Kai-shek in 1945, relations between mainland Chinese and Taiwan Chinese were very unhappy. The islanders, although they are Chinese ethnically, spoke a different language and felt that the mainlanders had sought to exploit them and treated them with immense brutality.”
Mitter is correct in highlighting the unhappy relations and brutality inflicted by the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwanese from 1945 to 1949 and beyond. However, his phrasing — “reclaim Taiwan” and “unification” — is historically inaccurate. What occurred was that Chiang’s government dispatched troops and officials to the island, but under US General Douglas MacArthur’s General Order No. 1 of September 1945, the Allies granted the Republic of China military forces only temporary administrative authority. Sovereignty over Taiwan, as a former Japanese colony, was to be settled by a formal peace treaty concluding World War II in the Pacific.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime therefore exercised de facto control over Taiwan and its surrounding islands, but under international law, this did not amount to sovereignty, which remained unsettled pending a formal treaty.
When the Treaty of San Francisco was signed in 1951 and entered into force in 1952, it stipulated only that Japan renounce sovereignty over Taiwan, but it did not specify a recipient. Most participants maintained that the island’s status should be determined in due course “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” which emphasized the principle of self-determination. As a result, the prevailing position of the US, the UK and other countries was that Taiwan’s international legal status remained “undetermined.”
One more point in his historic perspective where Mitter is not accurate is his description of the relative liberalization in the 1980s.
He writes, “Chiang Kai-shek’s successors were dictators on the island, and Mao Zedong’s [毛澤東] successors were dictators on the mainland, but they were both relatively liberalizing dictators. In the case of Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, [former president] Chiang Ching-kuo [蔣經國], authorized full democracy on the island.”
Yes, the 1980s did see relative liberalization in China and Taiwan, although in China, this opening was abruptly curtailed by the Tiananmen crackdown. Yet to claim, as Mitter does, that Chiang Ching-kuo “authorized full democracy” in Taiwan is inaccurate. Chiang did introduce limited reforms that made the system somewhat more open, but he continued to maintain tight control through powerful security organs such as the Taiwan Garrison Command and the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice. It was only under his successor, former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) — the first Taiwanese to hold the presidency — that Taiwan began its true transition toward the full democracy it has today.
For a peaceful resolution to be possible, it is essential for China and the rest of the world to accept Taiwan as a full and equal member of the international community.
A better understanding of where Taiwan came from is a much needed element in building the supporting narrative for this.
Gerrit van der Wees is a former Dutch diplomat who teaches the history of Taiwan and US relations with East Asia at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia.
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