A large part of the discourse about Taiwan as a sovereign, independent nation has centered on conventions of international law and international agreements between outside powers — such as between the US, UK, Russia, the Republic of China (ROC) and Japan at the end of World War II, and between the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since recognition of the PRC as the sole representative of China at the UN.
Internationally, the narrative on the PRC and Taiwan has changed considerably since the days of the first term of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the Democratic Progressive Party, when then-US president George Bush was rumored to have referred to Chen as a “troublemaker” for standing up for Taiwanese sovereignty. Historians would view the COVID-19 pandemic as a watershed moment in which the international community stopped seeing Taiwan as a troublemaker and woke up to the dangerous actions of the Chinese Communist Party.
This narrative arc was traveling in a direction beneficial to Taiwan from that point until recently, when tectonic changes in the international order and the coalition of democratic allies began to make Taiwan’s situation feel once more precarious and uncertain.
The problem with narrative arcs is that they do not always continue on a predictable trajectory. The same thing is happening within Taiwan. What until recently could be perceived as a discernible line from post-World War II majority association with China as the “motherland” to what has been termed “natural independence” — an increased identification among ROC citizens with Taiwan, and a corresponding decline in identification with China.
This process has everything to do with generational transitions, the family environment in which Taiwanese have been raised and changes in the education system. It is the story of how a nation developed an awareness of its own ability to seek to improve its circumstances, and realized the importance of struggling against the system to fight for principles such as freedom, democracy and autonomy.
Until recently, the assumption was that this process of “natural independence” would eventually reach its logical conclusion: All Taiwanese would identify with Taiwan as home, the place in which they and their parents were born, and the ties of older generations with the wave of Chinese who came over from China with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) after the war would fade away.
Just as generational change has placed ties with China further in the past, so is it now consigning the will for freedom so evident among the generation that fought for democracy in Taiwan to a distant past.
In “Youth, democracy and identities” (Sept. 11, page 8), Taiwan NextGen Foundation chief officer of operation Elaine Ko (柯亮羽) wrote a thoughtful piece on what she called a “subtle but significant change ... in the normalization of Taiwanese identity.”
One could argue that the overwhelming presence of “natural independence” has diluted the sense of urgency that once sustained it. As Ko wrote: “For those born after democratization, being Taiwanese is simply natural... If identity no longer feels at risk, the motivation to safeguard it may weaken... Democracy is not static; it must be renewed by each generation.”
This drive is diluted, but has not disappeared. Fifteen years ago, the discourse was that the younger generation that would later give rise to the Sunflower movement was politically unengaged. This year, we have seen the “Bluebird movement” and civic participation in the mass recall movement.
It is imperative to foster civic awareness of external threats and a national identity. In a democracy, the dilemma is to do this in a way respecting individual agency and choice, as opposed to ideological indoctrination. That distinction appears clear in principle. In practice, in the era of social media, propaganda and polarization, the line can be blurred.
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