Two days after South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol assumed office on Tuesday last week, the South Korean Ministry of Defense said that, effective immediately, it would no longer refer to a missile launch by North Korea’s military as a “firing of an unidentified projectile,” but would instead use the phrase “firing of a missile.”
This change shows that Seoul has stopped covering for Pyongyang and has decided to call each missile launch what it is: a provocative action. It also indicates that the Yoon administration intends to adopt a tougher stance toward North Korea.
Before Yoon became president, his foreign policy was widely acknowledged to be “pro-Washington, anti-Pyongyang and distant from Beijing.” The South Korean military’s change of policy toward North Korea’s missile firings shows that there is a renewed resolve in Seoul to push back against the North.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “offensive realism” — a structural theory in international relations — appears to have become the mainstream opinion within South Korea’s foreign policy community.
Offensive realism posits that the international system is anarchical, and individual nation states, as rational actors, must therefore take actions to protect themselves and guarantee their security through the construction of independent security capabilities. A unique aspect of the theory is its explanation of the interplay between regional actors.
The theory says that, in seeking to guarantee their own security, each nation expands their military forces and attempts to become the regional hegemon, which will eventually lead to conflict and war — such as has occurred between Russia and Ukraine.
The South Korean electorate’s selection of Yoon as their new president could be interpreted as a sign that they have had enough of Pyongyang’s provocations and threats.
Previously, South Koreans tolerated North Korea and continually sent messages of goodwill to their neighbor.
They understand that this has fallen on deaf ears and that North Korea presents a serious security threat to their country.
Many South Koreans therefore feel that they have no choice but to strengthen their defenses and adopt a more confrontational posture.
South Korea apparently adopting the “offensive realism” model bodes ill for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
There is a distinct possibility that the tense relationship between North Korea and South Korea could boil over into military conflict.
This would be a disaster not only for China and Japan, but also for Taiwan.
Jason Lee has a doctorate in international politics from National Chung Hsing University.
Translated by Edward Jones
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