A question on many people’s minds is whether the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine could lead to a major change in the US’ strategic direction, as happened after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
It is still too early to say whether the US would shift its strategic focus back to Europe, but after this war, NATO countries would certainly not be sending their navies to the Indo-Pacific region as frequently as they have done in the past couple of years.
They would need to pay attention to Russia’s threats, and the limited defense budgets of many NATO members would need to be invested in their armies and power projection capabilities, as well as expansion of their armed forces.
This would leave NATO countries no spare energy to engage in the Indo-Pacific region, and the US would also need more assistance from countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue regarding Indo-Pacific security affairs.
Having seen what is happening in Ukraine, US allies are likely reflecting on whether their interactions with the US need to be revised. They would need to be assured that, in the event of military conflict, the US would come to their aid militarily.
This is why the US found itself having to conduct patrols in the Indo-Pacific region recently to reassure its allies there.
A close eye should be kept on what happens at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia Security Summit (the Shangri-La Dialogue) attended by defense ministers, permanent heads of ministries and military chiefs of 28 Asia-Pacific states, and this year’s Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, as these could be key indicators of whether the war in Ukraine could lead to the US adjusting its strategic direction.
The Shangri-La Dialogue, held every June, focuses on important international security issues, and is a time for major countries to express their views on current strategies and global challenges.
Will the administration of US President Joe Biden make amendments to the Indo-Pacific strategy report released last month? Or are there new plans for the current international strategy? These questions are likely to be answered during this meeting.
The biennial RIMPAC exercise is a time for the US military and its allies to systematically integrate and verify new tactics. The indicators to observe are the countries that participate and the sizes of the forces they send to take part.
Also crucial is whether Taiwan would send an observer group or be invited to participate in the in simulated operations of the live-fire drills prior to the military exercises.
In addition to its impact on the global status quo and the international economy, the Russian invasion of Ukraine could also have a significant effect on the strategic thinking that has developed over the past two decades, touching on military strategies, the mistakes made leading up to the war, the application of cyberwarfare, the scramble for aerial and electronic supremacy, the manipulation of psychological operations, and comparative warfare systems — all of which are important for research into national defense and military security.
No matter how this war concludes, it will have a similar scale of impact on contemporary military affairs and strategic development as the Persian Gulf War in 1990 and the Iraq War in 2003, marking the starting point of a new chapter in strategic studies.
Lin Ying-yu is an adjunct assistant professor at National Sun Yat-sen University and a researcher at the Association of Strategic Foresight.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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