The big question after US President Joe Biden was elected was whether he would change former US president Donald Trump’s China policies. Since his inauguration, Biden has lived up to the general expectation that he would not, although he has changed strategy.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has repeatedly stressed that Trump’s tough stance on China was correct and said it was helpful to US foreign policy. While continuing Trump’s China policy, the Biden administration has been working to cooperate with democratic countries to “contain” China.
Trump laid bare Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) aspiration to become an “emperor” and made Americans confront China’s uncivilized rise head-on, paving the way for an effective tactic for the post-Trump era.
In a two-pronged approach, the White House and the US Congress are opposing China. The US’ Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act has been reintroduced in Congress, which would “authorize the president to use military force for the purpose of securing and defending Taiwan against armed attack,” while a congressional resolution has been proposed calling for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the US, the abandonment of the “one China” policy, and the recognition of Taiwan as an independent state.
Two things in particular are annoying China: First, US Navy Admiral Philip Davidson has said that the US must continue “consistent and persistent arms sales” to Taiwan and the US’ strategic ambiguity should be “reconsidered routinely.”
At a meeting at the US House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee, Blinken said that a push for Taiwan to be granted WHO membership would be initiated and that he would invite Taiwan, which he referred to as a “country,” to a democracy summit hosted by Biden.
The second irritant to China is the attempt to contain it. The US and the EU agreed on a temporary suspension of mutual tariffs on aircraft, wine, food and other products with the goal to focus on China, while it restarted the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Australia, India and Japan in shared opposition to Beijing.
On March 16, Blinken and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Toshimitsu Motegi and Japanese Minister of Defense Nobuo Kishi in Tokyo. The two parties stressed the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Blinken traveled to Alaska for talks with China. The US intentionally picked remote Alaska for the meeting after China held a Sino-US summit in Urumqi in Xinjiang. The political significance is self-evident.
Prior to the US meeting, Washington announced sanctions on 24 Chinese officials for eroding democracy in Hong Kong, and revoked authorization for China Unicom Americas and Pacific Networks to provide US telecommunications services, causing China to lose face.
After the talks in Alaska, the heat was turned up further. Japan let it be known, via a Kyodo report, that the US and Japan would cooperate closely should China make aggressive moves against Taiwan; the EU — for the first time in 30 years — placed sanctions on China due to human rights abuses; and 23 Republican lawmakers wrote a letter calling on Biden to initiate talks on signing a free-trade agreement with Taiwan, while US representatives proposed a bill to add Taiwan to the “NATO Plus” group of Washington allies.
China’s hegemonic behavior, and the way it treats its own citizens, minorities such as the Tibetans and Uighurs, as well as Hong Kongers, comes as little surprise to Taiwan, but now the world is seeing the sense in containing China.
Chin Heng-wei is a political commentator.
Translated by Perry Svensson and Paul Cooper
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS