Under the 25th amendment to the US constitution, the US president himself — or the US vice president with the agreement of eight US Cabinet officers, supported by the US Congress — can ask the vice president, in this instance Mike Pence, a Republican, to take over as acting president.
Adopted by the Congress in 1967 after then-US president John F. Kennedy’s assassination, the 25th amendment cleared up a vagueness in the constitution over succession in event of resignation, death or conviction in impeachment.
The least tricky part of the amendment is Section 4, which stipulates what would happen should US President Donald Trump be indisputably physically debilitated, either from an injury or ailment, so much that he could not communicate, but remained alive.
Then, the vice president would be in charge unless and until the president recovers.
If Pence is also unable to assume control, then powers would be delegated to the US House of Representatives speaker, in this case, Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat.
In the Congress, Democrats control the House, while Republicans are in a majority in the US Senate. What are the implications for the US presidential election and its aftermath?
Here we get into murkier territory. Some Americans have already begun casting their ballots in early voting prior to official election day, which is Nov. 3, including overseas residents and those in US states that permit early voting.
After the election, what happens if a president-elect dies during the “lame duck” period when the current presidential term is not over and the next president is officially inaugurated on Jan. 20?
Under the constitution’s 20th amendment, the vice president would become president. The question of who would be declared president-elect to be inaugurated to the position on Jan. 20 would involve discussions and probably battles at state, party, US Electoral College and court level.
In a worst-case scenario involving death or permanent incapacitation prior to the election, the US would face an unprecedented electoral crisis.
Unlike in some other countries — such as the UK — Americans vote for an individual on the ballot for president, not for a party. For example, there might be Republican and independent voters who reject Trump, but would be happy to vote for Pence, if he were the presidential candidate.
If Trump was taken off the ballot, the vote would become deeply undemocratic, as Pence was never voted on as the presidential nominee through a process of primary elections, which took place in the spring.
It is worth reiterating that we are nowhere near that stage at the moment, this is about theoretical procedure in US politics, and that although Trump has tested positive for COVID-19, there is little information on his condition and no prognosis.
What if former US vice president Joe Biden, the Democratic candidate, also became ill?
In either case, the party’s national committee, Republican or Democratic, would have to meet to formally nominate a new candidate.
While that should be straightforward — seeing the vice presidential candidate elevated — other candidates who were in the running in the primary stage could theoretically make a case for a hearing from their party.
It is also complicated by the fact that electors to the Electoral College at state level — a controversial layer of 538 representatives across the US who vote for the president based on the result of the popular vote in their state — would have to decide if votes already cast for a dead or incapacitated candidate would bind them to any replacement when the Electoral College meets after the election, in December.
What about postponement?
The date of US elections is fixed in law — going back to 1845 — and elections have gone ahead through war and crisis. Trump himself has been dismissed by Republicans for even suggesting a postponement because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The law says that US voters must go to the polls on the Tuesday after the first Monday of November every four years. This year, that is Nov. 3.
It would take an act of Congress — approved by both the House and the Senate — to change that.
What is the worst-case scenario?
There are potentially many. Biden has also been close to Trump recently and would be in a high-risk group if also infected, although Pence has said that he has tested negative.
Both are on the ballot and would cause issues if ill or incapacitated.
Postponements, selection of new candidates and reissuing of ballots might involve not only new legislation and potentially the US Supreme Court, but the parties themselves having to agree on mechanisms as well.
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