To coincide with the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, which opened on Tuesday last week, former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Youth League head Lin Chia-hsing (林家興), along with members of a group calling itself the “Republic of China (ROC) faction” within the KMT, launched a fundraiser to place an advertisement in the Washington Post.
The proposed ad was to elicit international support for Taiwan’s return to the UN, and for the resumption of US-ROC diplomatic relations. The fundraising banner bore the hashtags “Free China is coming back,” “anti-communism” and “ROCUN,” and included the line, in Chinese, “let the world see the ROC (Taiwan).”
The initiative began on Sept. 4 and ended 10 days later, just before the UN General Assembly opened. The goal was to raise NT$2.4 million (US$82,147), but it secured just over NT$40,000.
Perhaps the messaging left many scratching their heads. At least, the banner helpfully identified the ROC as Taiwan. Apparently, even the KMT, or at least the younger generation, understands that “the ROC” is less recognizable to the international community than “Taiwan.”
Lin and his group stressed the “anti-communism” and the “Free China” hashtags to differentiate the ROC from communist China, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic has increased suspicions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
However, to an international audience, the slogans appear anachronistic. There is no association between Taiwan and communism, nor any confusion over the difference between Taiwan and China, in the international discourse.
If the messages were for a domestic audience, the concept of “Free China” would have little relevance. The “anti-communism” tag might have appealed to the Taiwanese electorate, whose appetite has moved away from former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) pro-China policies, and probably also to some more practical members of the KMT thinking seriously about re-election prospects.
The distinction between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the ROC is contentious, at least, and sits at the root of the reason Taiwan — the ROC — was kicked out of the UN. It also lies at the core of the so-called “1992 consensus” that is proving such a headache for KMT Chairman Johnny Chiang (江啟臣).
The UN will only recognize one representative of China. Ma suggested a bid to return to the UN during his 2008 presidential election campaign, but quickly ditched the idea to pursue a “diplomatic truce” with the CCP that relied on the “1992 consensus,” with the ROC and PRC insisting upon their own interpretation of what “one China” means.
While Ma was congratulating himself on cultivating better economic relations with the PRC, he neglected to push his party’s definition of the ROC.
Meanwhile, China used its membership and influence within the UN to consistently push its message that the PRC is the only legitimate representative of China, and that Taiwan is a part of its territory.
Over the past decade, the CCP has systematically shifted the goal posts and gradually hijacked the meaning of the “1992 consensus,” to the extent that it is hardly recognizable.
Chiang has never turned his back on what he believes the KMT tradition and values to be, or on the ROC Constitution, but has maintained that he wishes to listen to voices of reform. He has thus far failed to wrest the KMT’s steering wheel from the hands of the Ma faction, and has not been allowed to move on from the “1992 consensus.”
During the party’s National Congress on Sept. 6, in a barely remarked-upon sleight of hand, Chiang shifted the goal posts himself, speaking of “the ‘1992 consensus’ based upon the ROC Constitution,” rolling back a decade of the CCP salami-slicing.
For that at least, he deserves some credit.
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