This month, several imported cases of COVID-19 have been reported in Taiwan, including some confirmed cases with unknown infection sources. With the global pandemic ongoing and a timeline for an approved vaccine unclear, Taiwan is again shadowed by fears of a second wave of infections.
In response to the situation, politicians and government officials have proposed new surveillance technology, to preserve the success of disease prevention efforts.
Former vice president Chen Chien-jen (陳建仁) has said that the key to winning the war against COVID-19 lies in innovative technologies and techniques, such as mobile apps that aid in social distancing and monitoring people’s health status, automated chest X-ray systems, virus strain analysis, and smart systems that utilize artificial intelligence and big data.
For example, in the first half of this year, Taiwan used innovative technologies to prevent community spread by establishing a database for isolated quarantine inspectors, constructing healthcare facilities and adopting a geofencing system.
The Central Epidemic Command Center worked with HTC’s healthcare division DeepQ and the Line messaging app, and in April launched a chatbot on Line called the “Disease Containment Expert” to provide information and care services to people in home quarantine.
The government also employed a location-based alert system that used information from cell towers to provide firsthand information on COVID-19 prevention.
Although innovative technologies have kept life normal, their active promotion by the government, plus fear of the virus’ spread, has caused people to neglect the potential risks and social inequality that come from their use, and the public has allowed the government to monitor and control their daily life with surveillance technology.
For example, the Israeli parliament last month allowed COVID-19 patients to be traced and monitored from their mobile phones, using surveillance technology from the Israeli security agency Shin Bet.
This measure, which uses anti-terror techniques for disease prevention, has raised serious concerns from national and international privacy groups.
Interestingly, a surveillance policy that seriously invades their privacy shows no sign of reducing Israelis’ confidence in their government and military’s ability to manage COVID-19 prevention.
Although this might be because Israelis have long endured surveillance at the hand of intelligence agencies, their acquiescence to the government’s decision to allow virus prevention technology to interfere with their daily lives is undeniably the main reason that such an invasion of privacy was permitted.
While surveillance technology might infringe on privacy, surveillance technology that is overly transparent sparks other concerns.
Following COVID-19’s appearance, the South Korean government took the astonishing strategy of tracking virus patients’ daily activities — such as having lunch in restaurants, going to movie theaters, visiting public amenities — and recording them in detail in a digital diary on the South Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Web site.
A surveillance measure of “extreme transparency” effectively slows the spread of the virus, but it also allows people with bad intentions to piece together location data of confirmed patients, to speculate on their real identity, and could eventually lead to stigmatization and discrimination.
Apart from focusing on the risk of privacy invasion created by government use of surveillance technology, people should be concerned about the growing social inequality created by its use.
In the US, where the virus is widespread, privacy at home — the first place that comes to mind when thinking of private space — is at risk.
Many tech companies have been competing with each other to launch “noncontact technology,” designed to reduce the possibility of infection through physical contact.
For example, some American landlords have installed a facial recognition system called BioConnect Cares to provide touchless door security, reducing the possibility of community transmission.
However, the system collects residents’ biometrics and health data, indirectly giving landlords their tenants’ private information, which could later be used as a bargaining chip in rent negotiation.
Apparently, the system exacerbates existing inequality between landlords and tenants, and severely undermines underprivileged people’s right to housing.
Used in the political arena, technology never remains neutral. Fortunately, people still have time to prevent privacy crises created by such technologies.
The government and residents of Taiwan should make good use of any time they might have before a second wave of COVID-19 to thoroughly examine these technologies, those in use and those waiting to be adopted.
Bear in mind that what protects people is not just “impartial and all-around data.”
Taiwanese should supervise how their government implements these technologies in the name of battling a pandemic, to avoid surveillance systems becoming a normal part of everyday life.
Besides, people should at times reflect on the risk of privacy invasion caused by new technology, and the inequality issues it can create.
Chang Liang and Wu Xiao-mi are studying for their master’s degrees at National Yang-Ming University’s Institute of Science, Technology and Society.
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